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The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried Treasure,
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate
Lisa H. Nicholson*
"His crimes have imposed on hundreds, if not thousands,
a life sentence of poverty.
I. INTRODUCTION
The headline read "Two Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and
Conspiracy Trial."'2 Kenneth L. Lay and Jeffrey K. Skilling, Enron
Corporation's former chief executives, were found guilty in May 2006
of lying to investors, employees, and regulators to cover up the en-
ergy-trading giant's dismal performance. 3 So ends the five-year saga
of the most notable high-profile corporate fraud scandal that began
with the October 2001 public revelation that Enron would restate its
earnings downward by $586 million for the period of 1997 through the
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1. U.S. District Judge Sim Lake reportedly declared while sentencing Enron Corporation's
former chief executive officer, Jeffrey K. Skilling. Purva Patel & Anastasia Ustinova, Sentence
Not Final Chapter for Some, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 24, 2006, at A8.
2. Alexei Barrionuevo, Two Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2006, at Al.
3. Id. The jury found that both Lay and Skilling orchestrated a conspiracy to artificially in-
flate profits, hide millions of dollars of debt, and misrepresent the true nature of the company's
finances. As a result, Lay was convicted on six counts of conspiracy, securities and wire fraud
and four counts of bank fraud. Skilling was convicted of eighteen counts of conspiracy and fraud
and one count of insider trading. Id. Lay faced a maximum combined penalty of 165 years for
his role, while Skilling at 52 faced a maximum of 185 years in prison. Id. See also Kristen Hays,
Lay and Skilling Convicted, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, May 26, 2006. However, Lay died from
heart disease in early July, just weeks after his conviction. As a result, Lay's criminal convictions
were vacated in mid-October, thus negating any punishment. Tom Fowler & Purva Patel, Judge
Voids Conviction Against Lay, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 18, 2006, at Al. Skilling, on the other
hand, was sentenced to 24 years and 4 months in prison, and ordered to turn over $45 million.
Kristen Hays, Tom Fowler, Purva Patel & Anastasia Ustinova, Hard Landing for Skilling,
HOUS. CHRON., October 24, 2006, at Al.
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first two quarters of 2001 due to accounting irregularities. 4 This cor-
porate fraud disclosure later proved to be both widespread (among
some of the nation's largest and most respected public companies)
and quite costly.5
Within seven months of Enron's bankruptcy filing, three other ma-
jor publicly-held corporations sought bankruptcy protection. They
were Global Crossing, Adelphia, and WorldCom. 6 Together with En-
ron, they constituted four of the six largest corporate bankruptcies in
U.S. history.7 WorldCom was the largest corporate bankruptcy with
$107 billion in assets protected by its filing, Enron was next with $63
billion, Global Crossing was fifth with $25.5 billion, and Adelphia was
sixth with $24.4 billion.8 The impact of these bankruptcy filings was
enormous. Thousands of investors, employees, retirees, and creditors
lost their livelihoods, their life savings, and their retirement benefits.
For example, the Enron scandal reportedly resulted in a $67 billion
loss to investors; 9 and more than 4,000 employees lost their jobs.10
WorldCom similarly laid off more than 20,000 employees, trimming its
overall workforce by ten percent from 2001 to June 2002.11 Indeed,
WorldCom shares (once worth over $100 billion) were collectively
worth almost nothing upon filing for Chapter 11 protection; 12 Global
4. See generally Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse: Audacious Climb to Success Ended in
Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, § 1 (Magazine), at 1. There are allegations that
Enron set up complex financial structures in the form of partnerships, limited-liability companies
and other affiliates to monetize assets and move debt off its balance sheets. Investors knew little
or nothing about the partnerships, which allegedly hid "hundreds of millions' of dollars of losses
and debt from public view." John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Murky Waters: A Primer on
Enron Partnerships, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, at Cl.
5. Ensuing investigations into the seemingly dubious financial reports of some of the nation's
other large public companies uncovered accounting irregularities at Kmart Corporation, Qwest
Communications International Inc., Global Crossing Ltd., Adelphia Communications Corp.,
Schering-Plough, WorldCom Inc., Tyco International Ltd., and Xerox Corporation, to name a
few. See Stephen Labaton, Downturn and Shift in Population Feed Boom in White-Collar Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002, at Al.
6. See Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Declares Bankruptcy; $107 Billion Filing
Largest in U.S. History, Hous. CHRON., July 22, 2002, at Al.
7. Id. Texaco and Financial Corporation of America, the other two largest filings occurred in
the late 1980s. Id.
8. Id.
9. Marianne Lavelle et al., The actions of corporate honchos horrified the nation. So when's
the day of reckoning, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 30, 2002, at 33.
10. Id.
11. Louis Uchitelle, Turmoil at WorldCom: The Workforce; Job Cuts Take Heavy Toll on
Telecom Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2002, at C1.
12. Romero & Atlas, supra note 6, at Al. By the time that it was de-listed from NASDAQ on
July 30, 2002, WorldCom's stock had fallen from a high of over $60 per share in 1999 to less than
a dollar per share. See Jonathan D. Glater, WorldCom Selects 2 for Reorganization Posts, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2002, at C12.; Robert Manor & Delroy Andersen, SEC Accuses WorldCom of
Fraud, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2002, at 1.
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Crossing's stock fell from a high of $64 dollars per share to less than
30 cents per share just before the company filed for bankruptcy; 13 and
Adelphia's shares fell from $20.39 per share on March 26, 2002 to a
low of 75 cents per share on June 3, 2002, the day it was delisted from
the Nasdaq and almost three weeks prior to its bankruptcy filing.14
The resulting decline in investor confidence in the integrity of the
capital markets contributed to an $8 trillion decline in the U.S. equity
markets from 2001 to 2002.15 The public's only solace in the subse-
quent years of 2002-2004 was to watch in disgust as numerous former
executives at these scandal-ridden public corporations eventually each
took a turn on the infamous "perp walk," including Lay and Skilling,
Enron's two former CEOs; 16 Andrew S. Fastow, Enron's former chief
financial officer ("CFO");17 John J. Rigas, Adelphia's founder and
former CEO;18 L. Dennis Kozlowski, Tyco's former CEO;19 as well as
13. Rebecca Blumstein et al., As Global Crossing Crashed, Executive Got Loan Relief, Pen-
sion Payouts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2002, at BI.
14. Sally Beatty, Adelphia Details Creditors for Filings for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., June 27,
2002, at B8.; Jerry Markon and Robert Frank, Adelphia Officials Are Arrested on Fraud Charges,
WALL ST. J., July 25, 2002, at A3.
15. See generally SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson, Remarks at the 2003 Washington
Economic Policy Conference (Mar. 24, 2003) (transcript available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch032403whd.htm). See also Gretchen Morgenson, What if Investors Won't Join the Party?"
N.Y. TiMES, June 2, 2002, at C4 (reporting that a May 2002 UBS/Gallop poll indicated that "84
percent feel that [the corporate scandal] issue is punishing stock prices ..."); Alex Berenson,
Hold On for a Wild Ride, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, § 4 (Magazine), at 1 (noting that as of July
21, 2002, the Standards and Poor's 500 index was down almost forty-five percent and the Nasdaq
was off nearly seventy-five percent).
16. Jeffrey Skilling was indicted in February 2004 on 36 counts, including wire fraud, securities
fraud, and insider trading in connection with his role in the fraudulent scheme that brought
down Enron in December 2001. At the time, he faced a maximum of 325 years in prison and
over $80 million in penalties if convicted on all counts. See Press Release, Dept. of Justice,
Former Enron Chief Executive Officer Jeffrey K. Skilling Charged with Conspiracy, Securities
Fraud, Insider Trading (Feb. 19, 2004) (available at 2004 WL 314797); Ex-Chief of Enron Pleads
Not Guilty to 42-Count Indictment, N.Y. TiMes, Feb. 19, 2004. Lay was charged in the same
indictment with securities fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy, bank fraud and insider trading. Dan
Ackerman, Ken Lay Indicted, Fights Back, FORBES. COM, July 8, 2004. See also Superseding
Indictment, U.S. v. Causey, Skilling and Lay (S.D. Tex. 2004) (Cr. No. H-04-25 (S-2)).
17. Andrew S. Fastow, who was originally indicted on 78 counts of wire fraud, conspiracy,
money laundering, in October 2002, was named in a 109 count superseding indictment, which
also charged securities fraud, and insider trading in connection with his role in the collapse of
Enron. See Superseding Indictment, U.S. v. Fastow, et al. (S.D. Tex. 2003) (Cr. No. H-02-0665);
Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Justice Dept. Expands Charges Against Former Enron CFO
Andrew Fastow, Broadband Execs (May 1, 2003) (on file with author). See also Susanne
Pagano, Fastow Enter Guilty Pleas Over Roles in Enron Financial Fraud, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
123 (Jan. 19, 2004). Fastow was the principal architect of the fraudulent accounting scheme.
18. John Rigas and his sons were arrested in July 2002 and accused of looting more than
$billion from Adelphia and of misleading regulators eventually leading to the company's bank-
ruptcy filing in June 2002. See Deborah Adamson & Matt Andrejczak, From Boardroom to
Courtroom, CBS.MarketWatch.com (Sept. 20, 2002).
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Bernard Ebbers and Scott D. Sullivan, WorldCom's former CEO and
former CFO, respectively. 20
Lay and Skilling's long-awaited convictions should serve as the cap-
stone to the government's successful prosecutions of (or plea agree-
ments with) the many high-profiled corporate fraudsters, including
Fastow, 2 1 Kozlowski, 22 the Rigas,23 Ebbers24 and Sullivan,25 to name a
19. Dennis Kozlowski was indicted in 2002 on charges of tax evasion, grand larceny, enter-
prise corruption, falsifying business records, and securities fraud, following allegations that he
and his cohorts misused company assets to the tune of $600 million. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-
Tyco Officers Get 8 to 25 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at Al.
20. See Indictment, U.S. v. Ebbers and Sullivan (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. S2-02 Cr. 1144 (BSJ));
Indictment, U.S. v. Sullivan (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. S1-02 Cr. 1144 (BSJ)). See also Kurt
Eichenwald, Even if Heads Roll, Mistrust Will Live On, The N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, § 3 (Mag-
azine) at 1.; Kurt Eichenwald, After a Boom, There Will be a Scandal. Count on It, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2002, at Cl.
21. Fastow pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and securities
fraud, admitting to having worked with other senior officers to disguise Enron's deteriorating
financial health, and to enrich themselves at the expense of Enron's shareholder. He also agreed
to surrender more than 23 million in civil and criminal penalties. See Pagano, supra note 17; Kurt
Eichenwald, Ex-CFO of Enron and Wife Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at C3. See also
Plea Agreement, U.S. v. Fastow (S.D. Tex. 2004) (Cr. No. H-02-0665). Prosecutors agreed to
recommend that he serve a 10-year sentence, the maximum under the two counts to which he
pleaded guilty. They also agreed to dismiss the remaining counts on which Fastow was indicted
if the prosecutors determined that he satisfactorily cooperated with the government. Id. In the
end, however, Fastow was sentenced to six years in prison. Kate Murphy & Alexei Barrionuevo,
Fastow Sentenced to Six Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at C6.
22. Tyco's Kozlowski facing up to 30 years in prison was convicted in 2005, after his first trial
ended in a hung jury. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tyco Ex-Chief is Humbled But Unbowed, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at Al.; Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Long to Jail White-Collar Criminals,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at C2. Kozlowski was subsequently sentenced to 8 1/3 to 25 years in
prison. Grace Wong, Kozlowski Gets up to 25 Years, CNN.com, Sept. 19, 2005.
23. Adelphia's John Rigas and his son Timothy Rigas were convicted in 2004 of using Adel-
phia's funds as their personal "piggybank," hiding more than $2 billion in company debt, with
John Rigas (at 80 years old) being sentenced to 15 years in prison, while Timothy Rigas was
sentenced to 20 years. See Adelphia Founder Sentenced to 15 Years, CNN.com, June 20, 2005.
Michael Rigas, John Rigas' other son, plead guilty to making a false entry in corporate docu-
ments in November 2005, forestalling a trial on more serious charges. See Larry Neumeister,
Adelphia Criminal Case Closed, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 24, 2005, at D3; Son of Adelphia
Founder Guilty of Falsifying Records, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at C9.
24. WorldCom's Ebbers was convicted in March 2005 on all charges - conspiracy, securities
fraud and filing false statements with regulators - for his role in the $11 billion accounting fraud
that forced WorldCom to seek bankruptcy protection in July 2002. See Brooke A. Masters, Ber-
nard Ebbers Guilty on All Counts, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2005, at Al.; Dionne Searcey, Shawn
Young & Kara Scannell, Ebbers is Sentenced to 25 Years for $11 Billion WorldCom Fraud, WALL
ST. J., July 14, 2005, at Al. Despite facing a purported maximum of 85 years in prison, the 63
year-old Ebbers was sentenced in July 2005 to 25 years. Searcey, Young & Scannell, supra. U.S.
District Court Judge Barbara Jones noted that "this sentence is likely to be life sentence... [but]
anything less would not reflect the seriousness of this crime." Id. More than 2.5 million investors
are estimated to have lost money in the WorldCom fraud, where the fraud and ensuing bank-
ruptcy wiped out stock that at its peak was valued at $180 billion. Id.
25. WorldCom's Sullivan was sentenced to five years in prison - a fifth of his initial exposure -
for his role in the $11 billion accounting fraud. The lighter sentence was based on his plea
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few. However, many of these defendants were not immediately im-
prisoned. Indeed, Lay and Skilling were allowed to go home to their
families pending their sentencing, despite facing over 100 years each
for their roles in bringing down Enron.26 Ebbers remained free pend-
ing the appeal of his 25 year sentence for his role in the $11 billion
fraud that led to WorldCom's bankruptcy; 27 and John Rigas, is free
pending the appeal of his 15 year sentence for looting Adelphia. 28
Only Kozlowski began almost immediately serving time in a New
York State prison pending the appeal of his 8 1/3 to 25 year sentence
for looting Tyco of $150 million. 29
Neither the indictments of these high-profiled corporate executives,
their subsequent convictions, nor their sentences (arguably among the
most stringent terms ever imposed on white-collar criminals) will
fully assuage victimized investors, many of whom still feel wanting.
Congress attempted to respond to the scandals in July 2002 by enact-
ing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200230 (the "Act" or "SarbOx"), which
creates some of the most sweeping changes in the areas of corporate
governance, financial disclosure, audit independence, and corporate-
criminal liability in recent decades. Unfortunately, the Act's criminal
measures 3' fall short of effectively sanctioning wrongdoers, or giving
victimized investors what they want.
agreement and ensuing cooperation in the government's prosecution of Ebbers. See Jennifer
Bayot & Roben Farzad, WorldCom Executive Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at C6. He
was ordered to report to prison three months after his sentencing. Id.
26. See Kristen Hays, Lay and Skilling Convicted, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, May 26, 2006.
Lay suffered a heart attack at his home in Colorado and died while awaiting sentencing. Carrie
Johnson, Enron's Lay Dies Of Heart Attack, WASH. POST, July 6,2006, at Al. Skilling petitioned
Judge Lake to allow him to remain free pending his appeal. Instead, Skilling was ordered to
home confinement and subjected to electronic surveillance until December 12, 2006 when he
reports to prison in Minnesota. See Kristen Hays, Hard Landing For Skilling, Hous. CHRON.,
Oct. 24, 2006, at Al.; Kristen Hays, Skilling Ordered to Report to Minnesota Prison by December
12, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 16, 2006 at A8.
27. See Carrie Johnson, Ebbers Asks to Stay Out of Prison During Appeal, WASH. POST, July
15, 2005, at D2. Remarkably, U.S. District Judge Barbara S. Jones (the presiding judge) said that
she would recommend that he serve his time at a low-security facility near his home town if he
did not win his bid to stay out of prison. Id. Ebbers remained free for eighteen months after his
conviction. He was finally ordered to prison to begin his sentence following the Second Circuit's
affirmance of his conviction. See Ex-WorldCom Chief is Ordered to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Sept., 8,
2006, at C2.
28. Id. See also Rigases to Be Free Pending Appeal, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2005, at C3.
29. See Ex-Tyco Officers File Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2006, at C6.
30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("the Act"), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 804 (2002). The
Act's provisions generally apply to all issuers, U.S. and non-U.S., required to file periodic re-
ports with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") pursuant to Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Exchange Act.
31. The Act's criminal measures, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part III, collectively
expand criminal liability for corporate officers and directors, brokers, dealers, and trading advi-
20071
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As Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-Md) aptly acknowledged during the
floor debates on the Act:
Punishing a bad apple may have something of a deterrent effect, but
there is nothing like putting a system into place that gives a height-
ened assurance that you are going to be accountable. That is what
investors are looking for.32
Increased fines and lengthened terms of imprisonment, therefore, are
only the first step towards combating corporate fraud and employing
applicable theories of punishment. Representative Richard Baker (R-
La) recognized as much during the Act's floor debates when he stated:
there are criminal consequences for [misrepresenting material facts
about the company]. In fact, the [pending bill] doubles the penalties
for violations of those responsibilities. But it is not enough .... It is
not enough that after we catch you we put you away for a long time.
We want to go after those ill-gotten gains, that profit you made by
misrepresenting the material facts of your corporation while manipu-
lating the books and profiting for your own best interests. We want
to make sure those mansions, those benefits, those golden
parachutes are collapsed, folded up neatly, put into a closet and sold
off so that the shareholders back home can get their hands on their
money.33
This article accordingly proposes the missing next step for addressing
corporate fraud: the mandatory imposition of asset forfeiture
sanctions.
Part II of this article re-introduces the white-collar criminal and
highlights the government's responses to previous instances of wrong-
doing by way of background. The Act's resulting criminal measures
are analyzed in Parts III and IV of the article. Part V examines the
proposed asset forfeiture sanction, while Part VI makes the case for
the application of the asset forfeiture sanction to these particular
white collar criminals. Finally, in Part VII, I explain how asset forfei-
ture can be obtained should Congress fail to enact specific forfeiture
legislation directed towards the newly-enacted securities fraud crime.
Asset forfeiture has been a weapon long acknowledged by Congress
and relied upon by prosecutors to combat rising drug trafficking and
organized crimes in the United States when fines and incarceration
sors, among others, by creating new federal offenses; modifying existing federal fraud statutes to
increase criminal fines and terms of imprisonment; and authorizing new amendments to the ex-
isting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See Titles VIII, IX and XI of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Sec-
tions 801-807, 901-906, and 1101-1107, respectively.
32. 148 CoNG. REc. S6524 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (testimony of Senator Sarbanes).




proved ineffective in stemming the tide.34 I propose that Congress
similarly act by amending 18 U.S.C. § 1348, the newly-enacted securi-
ties fraud statute, to include an asset forfeiture sanction in addition to
the existing language "shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not
more than 25 years, or both. ' 35 Specifically, where the corporation's
managers fraudulently manipulate its publicly-reported financial re-
sults to enrich themselves at the expense of corporate shareholders,
and in violation of the securities fraud statute, any funds obtained (in-
cluding any profits gained or losses avoided), as well as any assets
traceable thereto, should be forfeited. To enable victimized investors
to recover these funds, I also propose that Congress enact legislation
which allows these forfeited funds either to be returned to the corpo-
ration, or to victimized investors.
In the absence of such legislation, prosecutors routinely should rely
on existing legislation to seek the forfeiture of all assets traceable to
the corporate actors' wrongdoing - and not just for those high-profile
cases. While it may be true that the harm caused to investors could be
larger than any profits forfeitable by those corporate actors who mas-
termind fraudulent reporting schemes, these individuals will remain
willing to gamble on the big payoff in the long run unless the profit
incentive is eliminated from the corporate fraud equation. An asset
forfeiture provision that is directed towards these corporate fraudsters
will give victimized investors the "system" that they want: an adequate
means of deterrence and retribution.36
II. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL
The summer of 2002 brought forth a new villain following the wave
of corporate scandals that culminated with WorldCom's bankruptcy
filing. The Bush administration, in an about face, eschewed its earlier
"leave it to the SEC to punish bad apples" policy in favor of backing
34. See discussion infra Part V.
35. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 807 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 1348). As will be demonstrated infra,
the current asset forfeiture statutes are as complex to navigate as the Rubik's cube (the 1974
mechanical puzzle). See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(B). Moreover, to the extent that any forfeiture of proceeds is currently authorized for
violations of the federal securities law in particular, such a penalty is limited to the "fraud in the
sale of securities." See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(D).
36. See Former Enron Employees Cheer Convictions, or Shrug, BALTIMORE SUN, May 26,
2006 (reporting that after hearing of the convictions, one investor who lost her job and $1 million
in retirement savings stated, "I guess it gives me a little comfort, but it doesn't put back my
retirement money.").
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legislation that would crack down on corporate fraud.37 At the Act's
signing, the President declared that corporate executives who engaged
in corporate mismanagement could expect "no more easy money, just
hard time."38 The corporate executive of a scandal-ridden public
company thus became the newly-reviled so-called "white collar crimi-
nal."'39 This particular white collar criminal had escaped both media
and legislative scrutiny in the years leading up to Enron's collapse.40
The white collar criminal generally is thought to be an organization,
or a person of high or respectable social status, who commits "[i]llegal
or unethical acts that violate fiduciary responsibility or public trust []
usually during the course of legitimate occupational activity for per-
sonal or organizational gain. 41 Edwin H. Sutherland, a well regarded
sociologist, coined the term "white collar crime" over sixty years ago
when he sought to counter theories concerning the primary roots of
crime by emphasizing the social status and occupation of the offend-
ers, in addition to the circumstances surrounding the crime. 42 Suther-
37. See Joseph Nocera, For All Its Cost, Sarbanes Law is Working, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2005, at
B1. The administration resisted the tough corporate reform legislation, but subsequently acqui-
esced in response to reports that corporate fraud was eroding its political support. See Stephen
Labaton, Handcuffs Make Strange Politics, You Say? But Not in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2002, at Cl.
38. See Greg Hitt, Bush Signs Sweeping Legislation Aimed at Curbing Corporate Fraud, WALL
ST. J., July 31, 2002, at A4 (reporting that the new legislation will stiffen penalties for corporate
executives who misrepresent company finances. "Every corporate official who has chosen to
commit a crime can expect to face the consequences," according to President Bush, "No more
easy money for corporate criminals just hard time.").
39. Generally speaking, the white collar criminal is thought to be an organization, or a person
of high or respectable social status, who commits "[i]llegal or unethical acts that violate fiduciary
responsibility or public trust [ ] usually during the course of legitimate occupational activity for
personal or organizational gain." National White Collar Crime Center. Proceedings of the Aca-
demic Workshop: White Collar Crime Definitional 330 (1996). See Abraham S. Goldstein,
White Collar Crime and Civil Sanctions, 101 YALE L.J. 1895, 1895 n.2 (1992) (while observing
who commits white collar crimes noted that such crimes are those "committed by individuals or
organizations, usually in the course of business activity, and usually characterized by fraud or
falsehood and by complexity.").
40. In years past, public attention had focused on the insider trading scandals of the 1980s and
the savings and loan debacles of the 1990s, which included several money laundering scandals of
the 1990s. See discussion infra.
41. National White Collar Crime Center. Proceedings of the Academic Workshop: White
Collar Crime Definitional 33 (1996). See Abraham S. Goldstein, White Collar Crime and Civil
Sanctions, 101 YALE L.J. 1895, 1895 n.2 (1992) (observing who commits white collar crimes when
defining such crimes as those "committed by individuals or organizations, usually in the course
of business activity, and usually characterized by fraud or falsehood and by complexity.").
42. EDWIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 7 (1949). In 1939, Sutherland contradicted
leading theorists who argued that crime resulted from poverty, psychopathic or sociopathic con-
ditions during a speech to the American Sociological Society. See Edwin H. Sutherland, White
Collar Criminality, 5 AM. Soc. REV. 1, 2 and 9-10 and 12 (1940) (arguing that crime is in fact not
closely correlated with poverty or with the psychopathic and sociopathic conditions associated
with poverty because, first, the statistical generalizations are derived from a biased sample which
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land found that some crimes were "committed by [a person] of
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation" in
violation of a public trust.43 He also correctly recognized the substan-
tial impact on society caused by the misdeeds of these trusted individ-
uals, observing that the
financial loss from white collar crime, great as it is, is less important
than the damage to social relations ... [w]hite collar crimes violate
trust and therefore create distrust, which lowers social morale and
produces social disorganization on a large scale [while other] crimes
produce relatively little effect on social institutions or social
organizations. 4 4
Nevertheless, as Sutherland also observed, these "white collar
criminals [were] relatively immune [from prosecution] because of the
class bias of the courts, and the power of the class to influence the
implementation and administration of the law."145
Sutherland highlighted the essential nature of the harm (i.e., the
breach of trust) inflicted by this class of offenders by linking a particu-
lar social class to the crime. Unfortunately, his offender-based defini-
tion garnered severe criticism by other sociologists and criminologists
who relied on the traditional scope of criminal law because Suther-
land's definition did not differentiate between criminal and non-crimi-
nal behavior.46 More than twenty years later, Herbert Edelhertz (the
former head of the Fraud Section of the U.S. Justice Department),
redefined the term white collar crime, placing greater focus on the
offense, rather than the offender. 47 Thus, white collar crime came to
describe those "illegal acts committed by 'nonphysical means and by
concealment' in order 'to obtain money or property,... or to obtain
omits almost entirely the behavior of white collar criminals; second, the generalization that crim-
inality is closely associated with poverty is inapplicable to white collar criminals; and third the
conventional theories do not even explain the criminality of the lower class.). See also TONY G.
POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 9, 31-34 (1994); Gilbert Geis & Colin Goff, Intro-
duction to EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION ix (1983).
43. SUTHERLAND, supra note 42, at 7.
44. Sutherland, White Collar Criminality, supra note 42, at 5.
45. Id. at 7.
46. See TONY G. POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 33 (1994) (noting that Paul W.
Tappan and Robert G. Caldwell's disdain for Sutherland's definition appears to stem from their
inability to see the criminality of white collar offenses, observing that for Tappan, "all [acts] are
within the framework of the norms of ordinary business practices."). See also Richard A. Pos-
ner, Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 409, 409 (1980) ("The
coiner of the term 'white collar crime' defined it 'as a crime committed by a person of respecta-
bility and high social status in the course of his occupation,' but this is not a good definition.... I
shall instead . . . use the term white-collar crime to refer to the nonviolent crimes typically
committed by either (1) well-to-do individuals or (2) associations, such as business corporations
and labor unions, which are generally "well-to-do" compared to the common criminal.").
47. See POVEDA, supra note 46, at 40-42.
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business or personal advantage.' 48  The Department of Justice has
since further refined the definition of white collar crime to include
"those classes of non-violent illegal activities which principally involve
traditional notions of deceit, deception, concealment, manipulation,
breach of trust, subterfuge or illegal circumvention. ' 49 This definition
better reflects the resulting harms that were highlighted by Sutherland
more than sixty years ago.
What specifically sets white collar crimes apart from other types of
crimes (including so-called "street crimes") are that white collar
crimes typically occur in the fields of finance and industry where the
associated harms are less tangible, 50 the culpability of defendants is
less plain,51 and the conduct is less obviously immoral to some.
52
Street crimes, on the other hand, generally entail a "discrete event"
53
that is readily identifiable such as the crime of homicide, assault, rape,
48. See Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Corporate and White Collar Crime: A View by the Chairman
of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 287, 287 (1980) (quoting from H.
EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT, AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1970)).
49. See Tony G. Poveda, White Collar Crime and the Justice Department: The Institutionaliza-
tion of a Concept, 17 CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 235, 241 (1992) (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR WHITE COLLAR CRIME 5 (1977)).
50. Street crimes entail a "discrete event." Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigat-
ing and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go? 54
U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 406 (1993).
51. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT
WORK 4 (1985). Cf., Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White
Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go? 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 405, 408
(1993) (observing that the criminal activity involved in white collar crimes "is much more com-
plex than street crimes, usually consisting of a number of events spread over an extended period
of time, with the 'real' evidence frequently buried in reams of business and corporate records
relating to numerous transactions.").
52. Abraham S. Goldstein, White Collar Crime and Civil Sanctions, 101 YALE L.J. 1895, 1895
n.2 (1992). White collar crime typically includes the following offenses: securities fraud, tax
fraud, embezzlement, corruption, bribery, conspiracy to defraud, criminal regulatory violations,
antitrust, and bankruptcy fraud. See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A
PORTRAIT OF AT[ORNEYS AT WORK 30 (1985). See also Wheeler, Weisburd, Waring, Bonde,
White collar Crimes and Criminals, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 331 (1988) (including securities viola-
tions, anti-trust violations, bribery, embezzlement, mail and wire fraud, tax fraud, false claims
and statements, and credit fraud). The thread of Sutherland's offender-based definition still
remains. See Edwin H. Sutherland, White collar Criminality, 5 AMER. Soc. REV. 1, 2-3 (1940)
(noting that "[w]hite-collar criminality in business is expressed most frequently in the form of
misrepresentation in financial statements of corporations, manipulation in the stock exchange,
commercial bribery, bribery of public officials directly or indirectly in order to secure favorable
contracts and legislation, misrepresentation in advertising and salesmanship, [and] embezzle-
ment and misapplication of funds,... These varied types of white collar crimes in business and
the professions consist principally of violation of delegated or implied trust, and many of them
can be reduced to two categories: misrepresentation of asset values and duplicity in the manipu-
lation of power.").
53. Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime:
How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go? 54 U. Prr. L. REV. 405, 406 (1993).
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robbery, or burglary. Additionally, street crimes typically "involve [a]
threat and use of physical violence against persons, drug violations, or
theft involving use of force and other related crimes. '54
Sutherland aptly noted that it is the secretive, non-violent nature of
the criminal activities that chiefly separates white collar crimes from
street crimes, and not necessarily the nature of the resulting harm.
Indeed, in the case of the recent spate of corporate scandals, "the pen
[proved] mightier than the sword. '55 Corporate executives stole bil-
lions of dollars "with the stroke of a pen, or the push of a computer
key," 56 and harmed a long list of victims, including (in Enron's case,
for example) more than 14,000 employees who lost their retirement
savings due to having participated in the firm's 401K stock plans;57
more than 4,000 Enron employees who lost their jobs;58 countless in-
direct and direct investors in Enron securities whose investments were
devalued; 59 and other creditors who never received payment for
products sold or services rendered to the company.60
There is, interestingly enough, a continuing debate among legal
scholars and practitioners over the severity of punishment for white
54. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT
WORK 4 (1985). Cf, Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White
Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go? 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 405, 408
(1993) (The criminal activity involved in white collar crimes "is much more complex than street
crimes, usually consisting of a number of events spread over an extended period of time, with the
'real' evidence frequently buried in reams of business and corporate records relating to numer-
ous transactions.").
55. Edward George Earle Lytton Bulwer-Lytton (1803-1873). The quotation is taken from
Bulwer-Lytton's play Richelieu (1839), Act II, Scene II. The complete quotation is "Beneath the
rule of men entirely great, The pen is mightier than the sword."
56. See Richard Thornbough, former United States Attorney General, Forward: Sixth Survey
of White Collar Crime, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383, 384 (1991) (observing that a "street criminal
can steal only what he can carry. With a stroke of pen, or the push of a computer key, white
collar criminals can, and do, steal billions."). Indeed, while the numbers are still coming in on
the recent corporate frauds, the cost to U.S. taxpayers for the savings and loan scandals of the
late 1980s due to criminal fraud was by the most conservative estimates $6 billion, while losses
from bank robberies in the U.S. in 1989, totaled approximately $24.6 million, with the average
'take' being $3,951." TONY G. POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 11 (1994).
57. Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2002, at A6.
58. Id.
59. Enron's ten biggest shareholders were money managers of some of the top mutual funds,
including Alliance Capital, Janus Capital, Putnam Investments, Barclays Bank and Citigroup.
See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Enron's Collapse: The Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at C8. Other
indirect Enron investors include any investor in a Standard & Poor's index, before Enron was
dropped from the index in late 2001. Id.
60. For example, Enron owes Citigroup more than $1.1 billion, which is less than half of the
$2.6 billion owed to J.P. Morgan Chase. Riva D. Atlas, Despite Bumps, Citigroup 4th Quarter
Was Up, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at C4.
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collar criminals, as compared to their street crime counterparts, 61 with
some arguing (at least before this last round of white collar sentenc-
ing) that white collar criminals have been punished less severely than
street criminals despite the harm caused by their offenses. 62 This de-
61. See e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Long to Jail White-collar Criminals?, NY TIMES, Sept.
16, 2005 (reporting that a UCLA law professor said that Ebbers' sentence was "draconian,"
adding that 25 years is more than most people would get for rape or a nonaggravated murder");
Daniel Kadlec, Does Kozlowski's Sentence Fit the Crime?, TIME, Sept. 20, 2005 (reporting
Thomas Curran, a former New York city Prosecutor, response to Kozlowski's 8 to 25 year sen-
tence saying "Tyco is a real company with a real business plan that still employs thousand of
people . . . There are no retirees eating cat food because of Dennis Kozlowski."); Brooke A.
Masters, What Does 25 Years Do? WASH. POST, July 14, 2005 (reporting that "some lawyers were
asking whether the pendulum has swung too far," arguing that the convicted corporate execu-
tives' sentences were too harsh.)
62. See e.g., Michael D. Silberfarb, Justifying Punishment for White collar Crime: A Utilitarian
and Retributive Analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 95, 105 (2003) (citing
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Monitoring Data Files 1995-2001, noted that "the United
States Sentencing Commission reports that between 1991 and 2001, the annual average length of
sentence for white collar criminals always fell between 19.0 and 20.8 months [while] during that
same period, violent offenders received sentences ranging between 89.5 and 106.7 months, and
drug offenders received sentences ranging from 71.7 months to 88.2 months."); Kirby D. Behre
& A. Jeff Ifrah, Courts Not Soft on Fraud, Theft Crimes, NAT'L L.J. at A27 (March 10, 2003)
(observing that "reality does not confirm" the Department of Justice's 2002 claim that white
collar criminal were treated too leniently; noting that the existing disparities among the federal
courts); Michael Higgins, Sizing Up Sentences, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1999 (noting the disparity in sen-
tencing white collar criminals); Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contin-
gency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2001) (noting that this conflict is mediated
inconsistently, so that criminal liability is distributed more unevenly among white-collar or cor-
porate offenders than it is among street offenders); Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White collar
Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 487-89 (1999); Martin F. Murphy, No Room at the Inn? Pun-
ishing White collar Criminals, 40 BOSTON BAR J. 4, 14 (1996) (observing that prior to 1987, most
judges believed that "the suffering experienced by a white collar person as a result of apprehen-
sion, public indictment, and conviction as well as the collateral disabilities incident to each - loss
of job, revocation of professional license, diminishment of status in the community - itself a kind
of punishment"); Deborah Young, Federal Sentencing: Looking Back to Move Forward, 60 U.
CIN. L. REV. 135, 142-43 (1991) (observing, while critiquing In Sitting in Judgment: The Sentenc-
ing of White-Collar Criminals, by Wheeler, Mann and Sarat, that the authors do not reach a
conclusion about whether there is a judicial bias in sentencing white collar criminals notwith-
standing that the judges who participated in their study did in fact employ a different analysis of
blameworthiness and the seriousness of the crimes charged).
Some scholars have reasoned that the disparity in punishment may exist because white collar
offenders have numerous tools at their disposal to combat allegations of wrongdoing that street
crime offenders are without; including expert legal counsel, the financial means to mount effec-
tive defenses, political connections, alternate enforcement paths to avoid prison sentences, and
social legitimacy. See Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White Collar Criminals? 23 S. ILL. U. L.J.
485 (1999). See also Jon J. Lambriras, White Collar Crime: Why the Sentencing Disparity Despite
Uniform Guidelines?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 459, 504-525 (2003) (noting that both judges and prosecu-
tors play a part in the wide sentencing disparities of white collar criminals).
Another explanation for the differing criminal penalties may rest in the marked difference in
the manner in which white collar crimes and street crimes are investigated and, therefore, prose-
cuted. Professor Kenneth Mann first set forth the differences almost twenty years ago in his
well-regarded work, entitled Defending White Collar Crime. See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING
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bate on punishment will rage on as more and more offenses are com-
mitted by these so-called trusted persons, and they are sentenced
accordingly. It is worth noting at this juncture that some of the bank
officers and directors who participated in the savings and loan debacle
of the 1990s, and the corporate fiduciaries and investment bankers
who participated in the insider trading scandals that marked Wall
Street during the 1980s, similarly were sentenced to seemingly lengthy
prison sentences at the time. In fact, Michael Milken (the so-called
"Junk Bond King") and Charles Keating (the banker) were sentenced
to 10 years, and 12.5 years, respectively.63 However, adding fuel to
the sentencing debate, neither served his full term - with Milken serv-
ing 22 months, and Keating serving 4.5 years.64
In any event, the purpose of this article is not to debate the issue of
which group of offenders is punished more harshly than the other.65
Instead, I seek to highlight the shortcoming of the congressional legis-
lation that followed the wave of corporate accounting scandals. Con-
gress, in response to earlier crime waves, not only legislated enhanced
penalties that included high fines and lengthy terms of imprisonment,
but also mandated the forfeiture of assets involved in, or traceable to,
the wrongdoing.66 This time, however, Congress let a viable sanction
get away in favor of imposing just hard time on those corporate man-
agers who participate in corporate accounting scandals.
III. SARBOX'S CRIMINAL MEASURES: "JusT HARD TIME"
A. The Climate for Change
Congress, fueled by investor outrage and market skepticism, began
convening hearings in early 2002 to determine who or what was to
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 9-13 (1985). These differences
remain relevant today, particularly from the defense lawyer's perspective. Defense attorneys
handling street crimes usually are not called upon until the client is charged, and is then limited
to successfully plea-bargaining away the client's guilt. See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE
COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 4 (1985). In stark contrast, the white
collar offender typically retains counsel before the criminal investigation is even completed, and
in some cases, even before the investigation gets underway - thereby enabling the white collar
offender's defense counsel to argue the client's innocence on numerous occasions before any
charging decision is made. Id. at 5. In fact, counsel's intensive advocacy continues, even after
plea agreements are reached to bring about the desired punishment. Id.
63. See Grace Wong, Kozlowski Gets Up to 25 Years, CnnMoney.com, Sept. 19, 2005, at http://
money.cnn.com/2005/09/19/news/newsmakers/kozlowski-sentence/index.htm (last visited Feb.
16, 2007).
64. Id.
65. For an analysis of this debate, see Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the
Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1311-60 (2001). See also Russ
Mitchell, White collar Criminal? Pack Lightly for Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, at B3.
66. See discussion infra Part V.
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blame for what would become a steady stream of corporate account-
ing scandals and the ensuing bankruptcies. 67 Accountants, corporate
officers and directors, investment bankers and Wall Street analysts,
and (subsequently) lawyers came under intense scrutiny during these
hearings.68 The subsequent passage of SarbOx by an almost unani-
mous vote on July 25, 2002,69 and its signing by the president five days
later,70 was supposed to stem the tide of faltering investor confidence
and the declining capital markets through mid 2002.71
Congress and the president had finally realized, and heeded calls to
demonstrate, that governmental regulations and corporate accounta-
bility were not inconsistent partners. 72 What resulted is legislation
67. Congressional inquiries as well as criminal and regulatory investigations commenced in
early 2002 to focus on the role of Enron and its outside auditor, Arthur Andersen L.L.P., in
connection with the surprise collapse of the energy trading giant. Much of their inquiries fo-
cused on Andersen's failure to flag Enron's financial problems during the course of Andersen's
audits, and Andersen's failure to disclose details of Enron's controversial financing arrange-
ments. See generally William C. Powers et al., Report of the Special Litigation Committee (Feb.
1, 2002), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicre-
port020102.pdf. Subsequently, the House Financial Services Committee's hearings on the
problems at Enron expanded to include accounting irregularities at Global Crossing, and the
questionable practices at WorldCom. See Simon Romero, House to Question Execs of
WorldCom, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at Cl.
68. Id.
69. The Act was approved by both houses of Congress on July 25, 2002, with a vote of 99-0 in
the Senate and a vote of 423-3 in the House. See Landmark Reforms Enacted for Auditing,
Corporate Governance, 71 U.S. L. WK 5 (2002); Richard B. Schmitt, Michael Schroeder & Shai-
lagh Murray, Corporate- Oversight Bill Passes, Smoothes Way for New Lawsuits, WALL ST. J.,
July 26, 2002, at Al; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. Negotiators Agree on Broad Changes in Business
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at Al. See also Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, Remarks at
Advanced ALI-ABA Course Study (Jan. 9, 2003) ("In response to investor outrage and political
pressure, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It is sweeping legislation intended to hold
corporate executives and auditors more accountable to the shareholders of pubic companies. It
calls for a re-examination of our corporate governance structure and seeks to fill in the holes
that have left investors out in the cold."). The speech is available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spchOlO9O3psa.htm.
70. See George W. Bush, Statement by the President of the United States Upon Signing Pub.
L No. 107-204 (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
73333 (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
71. See Greg Hitt, Bush Signs Sweeping Legislation Aimed at Curbing Corporate Fraud, WALL
ST. J., July 31, 2002, at A4 ("Spurred by the public's shaken confidence in the economy, Presi-
dent Bush signed sweeping legislation aimed at curtailing fraud and corruption in corporate
America.... [This new legislation was ushered in by] a wave of scandals that began with the
collapse of Enron last December [2001] and soon widened to include disclosures of accounting
irregularities at Global Crossing Ltd., Tyco International, Ltd, Qwest Communications Interna-
tional Inc., and WorldCom Inc, among others."). See also, Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Negotiators
Agree on Broad Changes in Business Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at Al.
72. See Stephen Labaton, SEC Leader Sees Outside Monitors for Auditing Firm, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2002, at Al; Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor: Experts Say the Energy Giant's Collapse
could Trigger Changes in the Law That Make it Easier to Snare Professionals, 88 A.B.A. J. 40
(Apr. 2002). See also Alex Berenson, The Biggest Casualty of Enron's Collapse: Confidence,
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aimed at stamping out deceptive accounting and management prac-
tices by establishing deeper oversight, holding top executives more di-
rectly responsible for corporate public filings, and requiring more
transparent corporate books and records. 73 In an attempt to demon-
strate that they were also tough on corporate crime, the politicians
enacted enhanced criminal penalties purportedly to deter and punish
corporate fraudsters - but only at the eleventh hour.
The base text for the Act was the "Public Company Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002" ("S. 2673" or the
"Sarbanes Bill"), sponsored by Senate Banking Committee chairman
Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), which passed the Senate by a bi-partisan vote
of 97-0 on July 15, 2002. 74 The House earlier had passed a version of a
competing bill, the Corporate and Auditing Accounting, Responsibil-
ity and Transparency Act of 2002 ("H.R. 3763" or the "Oxley Bill")
introduced by Representative Michael G. Oxley (R-Ohio), by a 334-
90 vote on April 24, 2002. 75 The Oxley Bill focused on transparency
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, § 4, at 1 ("Securities markets are all about numbers, from sales and
profits to debt outstanding. If investors cannot believe the figures put out by public companies,
they will be much less willing to risk their money on stocks. For two generations, a rigorous
system of private disclosure and public oversight has given American investors confidence that
they will not be fleeced when they buy stocks .... But Enron's collapse has put that hard-won
confidence at risk." According the Arthur Levitt, "To restore confidence in American markets,
Congress and regulators need to take specific steps to strengthen the disclosure regime."); Diana
B. Henriques, Enron's Collapse: Keepers of the Books; Policing the Accountants With a Watchdog
From the Accounting Busines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at A12 (quoting Richard C. Breeden,
"Congress is ultimately going to have to fashion a solution. We need a national debate on the
[accountants' self-regulation] system and what's wrong with it because we are well past the point
when Band-Aids will work."). In late July 2002, respondents to a Wall Street JournalNBC poll
reportedly were asked whether they thought most government regulations were "necessary and
protect consumers or the environment" or were "unnecessary and harm the economy." Fifty-
two percent of the people polled in the summer of 2002 believed that such regulations were
necessary as compared to forty percent of the people polled in January 1995. Ruy Teixeira, Is the
Big-Business Era Over? 13 AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 26, 2002, at 12.
73. Richard B. Schmitt, Michael Schroeder & Shailagh Murray, Corporate-Oversight Bill
Passes, Smooths Way for New Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at Al. The Act was enacted
"to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes." See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 804 (2002) (preamble).
74. 148 CONG. REC. S6735 (daily ed. July 15, 2002). See Senate Passes Accounting Reform Bill;
Landmark Measure Moves to Conference, 71 U.S.L.W. 2053 (2002). See also David E. Sanger &
Richard Oppel, Jr., Senate Approves a Broad Overhaul of Business Laws, N. Y. TIMES, July 16,
2002, at Al (noting that by approving the Sarbanes Bill, the Senate sought, inter alia, to establish
an independent accounting oversight board; bar auditors of publicly traded companies from en-
gaging in certain consulting work; require real-time disclosure of insider transactions; preserve
securities law judgment or settlements in bankruptcy; and give the SEC greater authority, inter
alia, to obtain officer and director bars).
75. See Juliet Eilperin & Jackie Spinner, House Passes Accounting Reform package; Bill May
Face Senate Test, WASH. POST, April 23, 2002, at Al.
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in, and oversight of, corporate accounting practices, 76 but was criti-
cized as not going far enough to punish the corporate fraud occurring
at publicly-traded companies.77
During the floor debates on the Sarbanes Bill (which was intro-
duced in June 2002 to address corporate fraud more broadly than the
earlier Oxley Bill), numerous amendments were introduced to specifi-
cally deal with the criminal fraud element of the accounting scan-
dals.78 Remarkably, the Act's criminal measures were not even
discussed until early July 2002.79 Of course, much had happened since
the April 2002 passage of the Oxley Bill to explain the renewed inter-
est in corporate responsibility and accountability. First, the capital
markets continued to decline.80 Second, newly-discovered accounting
irregularities at three additional large publicly-held companies -
Adelphia, WorldCom and Xerox - reportedly added weight to the ar-
gument that any new legislation to address white collar crimes had to
have teeth in order to effect any real change in corporate behavior,
accountability and transparency. 81 Consequently, the legislation that
76. See generally The Corporate & Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, Transparency Act
of 2002, H.R. Rep. No. 107-414 (2002). The Oxley Bill was passed in response to the bankruptcy
filings by Enron and Global Crossing as well as the then-recent earnings restatements by several
prominent other corporations. See id. at 18.
77. See Kurt Ritterpusch, Retirement Policy: Democrats Criticize GOP Efforts At Pension So-
cial Security Reform, WASH. INSIDER, May 16, 2002 (noting that Democrats criticized propose
House measures as inadequate without plans for tough criminal penalties).
78. Cf. Report of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs to Accompany S.
2673, S. Rep. No. 107-205 (2002). (referencing bill summary and status, 107th Cong. (2002)). See
infra for a detailed discussion of the Act's criminal measures which arose from these
amendments.
79. See generally Report of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs to Ac-
company S. 2673, S. Rep. No. 107-205 (2002). Accord 148 CONG. REc. S6436-01; 148 CONG.
REC. S6575-01, Congressional Record - Senate Proceedings and Debates (July 9, 10, 2002). See
also, Phyllis Diamond & Brett Ferugson, Accounting: Key Democrats Urge Bush Support For
Bill to Punish Corporate Wrongdoers, WASH. INSIDER, July 3, 2002. Once WorldCom collapse
became public, the move towards strengthening or enhancing criminal penalties took root. See
Elisabeth Bemiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002,
at Al; Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Declares Bankruptcy; $107 Billion Filing
Largest in U.S. History, Hous. CHRON., July 22, 2002, at Al; Rachel McTague et al., Despite
Partisan Mood, Senate Votes 97-0 to Add Penalty Measures to Accounting Bill, WASH. INSIDER,
July 11, 2002.
80. This also may be due in part to the fact that the Dow Jones industrial average plunged
during a volatile day of trading on the same day as the Senate vote by as much as 440 points, and
closed down 45 points and also because the dollar fell below the value of the euro for the first
time in two and a half years. See David E. Sanger and Richard Oppel, Jr., Senate Approves a
Broad Overhaul of Business Laws, N.Y.TIMES, July 16, 2002, at Al.
81. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Negotiators Agree on Broad Changes in Business Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2002, at Al. See also Richard B. Schmitt, Michael Schroeder & Shailagh Murray,
Corporate-Oversight Bill Passes, Smooths Way for New Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at
Al ("At first, concerns about corporate scandals were contained to Enron and its accounting
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emerged from the late July 2002 conference adopted a tougher stance
on corporate fraud.82
SarbOx's resulting criminal measures collectively expanded crimi-
nal liability for corporate officers and directors, brokers, dealers, and
trading advisors, among others, by creating new federal offenses,
modifying existing federal fraud statutes to increase criminal penal-
ties, and authorizing the enhancement of existing sentencing guide-
lines. These measures, which are scattered over three separate titles of
the Act - (i) Title VIII, the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accounta-
bility Act of 2002;83 (ii) Title IX, the White collar Crime Penalty En-
hancement Act of 2002;84 and (iii) Title XI, the Corporate Fraud and
Accountability Act of 2002 at Title X185 - were initially introduced by
the Senate on July 9, but were strengthened by the House's second bill
introduced a week later.8 6 Their eleventh-hour inclusion signals Con-
gress' initial reluctance to wield a big stick to combat corporate fraud,
firm, Arthur Andersen LLP.... [b]ut as corporate-governance scandals spread to Global Cross-
ing Ltd., Tyco International Ltd., WorldCom Inc. and others, and the stock market plunged,
momentum built quickly for broader reforms."). See also, Karen Masterson & John C. Henry,
WorldCorn Woes Add New Impetus to Reformist Calls, Hous. CHRON., June 27, 2002, at Al.
82. See Conference Report to Accompany S. 3763, H. Rep. No. 107-610 (2002). According to
Representative Oxley, "The Senate built on the House bill's chief objectives, strong oversight for
accountants, increase corporate responsibility, and improved information for investors." Tran-
script of Conference Report on H.R. 3763, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (House of Representa-
tive - July 25, 2002) at page H5462. The conference report also contains additional provisions
offered only by the House, including inter alia, provisions to require real-time disclosure of in-
vestor information; to toughen punishment for those convicted of corporate fraud; to return ill-
gotten gains to investors; and to create a disgorgement fund real-time. Id. A second House
reform bill (the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 5118) which provides for
even greater criminal penalties for accounting and auditing improprieties at publicly traded com-
panies was introduced by Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) on July 15 and was passed by a
vote of 391 to 28 in the House the next day. See id. at page H5463. See also Congressional
Record Daily Digest (July 15-16, 2002). The bill's stiffer penalties were also subsequently incor-
porated into the Act when it emerged from the conference on July 24, 2002. See Conference
Report to Accompany S. 3763, H. Rep. No. 107-610 (2002).
83. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 801-807, 116 Stat. 804 (2002).
84. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 901-906.
85. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 1101-1107.
86. On July 10, 2002, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del) initially proposed what would eventually
become the White-collar Crime Penalty Enhancement (WCPE) Act after some modifications.
See 148 Cong. Rec. S6524, at S6541-S6542, S6548-S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Biden). What would eventually become the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability
(CCFA) Act, after some modifications, was introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and
others on July 9, and 10, 2002. His proposal sought to create a new felony for defrauding share-
holders of publicly traded companies; create two new document destruction felonies relating to
shredding or altering certain corporate records; mandate a review of the sufficiency of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines; protect corporate whistleblowers; lengthen the state of limitations for
fraud; and provide for the preservation in bankruptcy of debts incurred under securities law
judgments or settlements. See 148 Cong. Rec. S6524, at S6538, S6541 (2002).
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which seemingly faded in response to voter pressures.87  Neverthe-
less, the Act's criminal measures provide "the absolute minimum pro-
tections" to investors. 88 As will be illustrated, Congress failed to
sufficiently close the vault doors to the easy money89 when it failed to
enact legislation that also would reach the spoils of the corporate ac-
counting frauds.
B. The Political Response to Corporate Fraud
1. Enact New Crimes
Congress created several new offenses to curb abuses by corporate
executives of publicly-traded companies in order to close perceived
loopholes in the existing federal statutes.90 Specifically, Section 807
87. See Transcript of Conference Report on H.R. 3763, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 148
CONG. REc. H5462-02, at H5463 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Baker) ("Nothing
perhaps made a more visual impact on American investors, shareholders, pensioners and em-
ployees than watching the news yesterday as corporate executives were handcuffed and hauled
away. The people of America are not only expecting it, they are demanding it."). See also
Rachel McTague et al., Despite Partisan Mood, Senate Votes 97-0 to Add Penalty Measures to
Accounting Bill, WASH. INSIDER, July 11, 2002; Greg Hitt, Bush Signs Sweeping Legislation
Aimed at Curbing Corporate Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, at A4; David Futrelle, What is the
Government doing to Help? MONEY, Sept. 2002, at 81.
88. See Transcript of Conference Report on H.R. 3763, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 148
Cong. Rec. H5462-02, at H5470 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Julia Carson (D- IN)
("The conference bill before us today provides the absolute minimum protections to protect
investors and restore market confidence. Still this measure could be stronger and certainly dis-
gorging the ill-gotten gains of these criminals and redistributing profits to the victims must be the
next step. . . . Assets [acquired] through fraud and betrayal of confidence should not be allowed
to stand when countless Americans close to retirement must now rethink how they will downgrade
their retired lives .... [l1f crime does not pay, Congress must reaffirm that truth.") (emphasis
added). Accord Transcript of Conference Report on H.R. 3763, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
148 Cong. Rec. H5462-02, at H5463 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Baker (R-La))
("We want to go after those ill-gotten gains, that profit you made by misrepresenting the mate-
rial facts of your corporation while manipulating the books and profiting your own best interests.
We want to make sure those mansions, those benefits, those golden parachutes are collapsed,
folded up neatly, put into a closet and sold off so that shareholders back home can get their
hands on their money. ... This bill does not go quite that far, but over the next Congresses we
are going to continue to work to make sure that no one who is defrauded by an irresponsible act
of corporate abuse does not get full recompense for the wrong.").
89. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 2002, at Al (President Bush reportedly declared at the Act's signing, "Every corporate offi-
cial who has chosen to commit a crime can expect to face the consequences. No more easy
money for corporate criminals, just hard time.").
90. In addition to those new crimes discussed in this article, the Act also creates new federal
crimes relating to the destruction of documents or audit work-papers and evidence tampering
with respect to documents to be used in an official proceeding. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 802 and § 1102, 116 Stat. 804 (2002).
Congress also enacted a separate measure to protect corporate whistleblowers. In order to
ensure that employees who unearth corporate fraud at publicly-traded companies either will
provide information to, or otherwise assist, a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, a
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provides that any securities fraud involving a public company is a sep-
arate and distinct federal crime. 91 The new securities fraud statute
mirrors the language of the federal bank fraud statute and is violated
when one knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or
artifice (1) to defraud persons in connection with any security of a
publicly held company, or (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or property in
connection with the purchase or sale of such a security. 92 Any violator
of this statute shall be fined or imprisoned up to 25 years, or both.93
Securities fraud prosecutions purportedly will be easier because the
new statute does not require proof of a willful violation.94 Federal
prosecutors need only show a "knowing" intent to defraud. They also
need not prove that fraud was made in connection with a "purchase or
sale." 95
Section 902 criminalizes "attempts and conspiracies to commit"
criminal fraud offenses.96 "[Alny person who attempts or conspires to
commit any of the offenses under this chapter shall be subject to the
same penalties as those prescribed for the offense," as if the attempts
or conspiracies had succeeded. 97 At first glance, this offense may
seem redundant with respect to the existing law that criminalizes con-
spiracy to commit a federal crime. 98 It is not; the recently-enacted
conspiracy offense is an independent crime that is committed regard-
less of whether the conspiracy comes to fruition. Conviction under
the general conspiracy statute subjects the violator to a maximum five-
year sentence. 99
member of Congress or a "person with supervisory authority" over the employee, Congress also
enacted Section 1107 of the Act to protect whistleblowers. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §1107 (cre-
ating 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e)). The new law authorizes the imposition of criminal penalties for "any
[retaliatory] action harmful to any person." Section 806 of Title VIII of the Act also protects
whistleblowers by providing them a private right of action for compensatory damages.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act §806 (creating 18 U.S.C. 1514A).
91. Sarbanes-Oxley §807 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2007)).
92. Id. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2007).
93. Sarbanes-Oxley § 807 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2007)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Sarbanes-Oxley § 902 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 1349)
97. Id.
98. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2007). Section 371 provides: "if two or more persons conspire either
to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2007).
99. See id.
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Section 906 provides that corporate executives who certify their
companies' publicly-filed financial reports may be criminally prose-
cuted for those filings that are found not to be in compliance with the
federal securities laws, or other statutory requirements. Specifically, a
public company's CEO and CFO must certify in writing that the com-
pany's periodic financial reports (filed with the SEC pursuant to sec-
tion 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act0° ) "fairly presents" the
company's financial condition and operational results or face criminal
penalties. 10 1 Failure to comply with the certification requirements
can result in the imposition of monetary penalties up to $1,000,000 or
10 years imprisonment. 10 2 Willful failures to comply will result in the
imposition of monetary penalties up to $5,000,000 or 20 years
imprisonment. 10 3
This new offense forces CEOs and CFOs to take responsibility for
the accuracy of the records their company files with the Commission,
or be subject to criminal liability for any inaccuracies. Moreover, the
statute makes no reference to generally accepted accounting princi-
ples ("GAAP").10 4 Consequently, a signing officer could be liable
under this certification provision if a particular transaction or material
liabilities were hidden from investors, even though the company's
financials complied with GAAP.
2. Enhance Existing Criminal Penalties
Congress also increased the criminal penalties fourfold for viola-
tions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"),
as well as the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes.10 5 Section 903 of the
Act increased the maximum prison terms for persons convicted of
mail fraud and wire fraud from five years to 20 years each. 10 6 Con-
100. 15 U.S.C § 78m(a) or 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
101. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906 (creating 18 U.S.C. § 1350). The new section also dictates
the contents of the certification. Id. Criminal liability will attach for any certification made in
connection with a deceptive financial statement. Specifically, anyone who "certifies any state-
ment ... knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with
all of the requirements... shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both." The criminal penalty increases to $5,000,000, or 20 years if the CEO or CFO




105. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7210) (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343); Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 904
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (2002)). See also David E. Sanger, Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Senate
Approves a Broad Overhaul of Business Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at Al ("Amendments
that were considered dead only a few weeks ago passed by comfortable margins.").
106. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 903 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343)
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gress selected these particular statutes because it recognized that
those offenses are "among the most frequently charged federal crimi-
nal statutes" in white collar crime situations. 0 7 Congress also in-
creased the maximum fine and prison term for individuals who violate
the criminal provisions of ERISA from $5,000 and one year to
$100,000 and 10 years by amending ERISA Section 501.108 The maxi-
mum fine for entities other than individuals is raised from $100,000 to
$500,000.109 Similarly, section 1106 of the Act similarly increased the
penalties provided by Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act, which estab-
lished the criminal penalties for numerous securities violations. 110
The maximum fine and prison term for individuals was raised from
$1,000,000 and 10 years to $5,000,000 and 20 years; for entities, the
maximum fine was raised from $2.5 million to $25,000,000."'1
3. Amend Existing Sentencing Guidelines
SarbOx's criminal measures would have had little practical effect
without some corresponding adjustment to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (the "Guidelines")." 2 This was, of course, prior to the Su-
107. See Shani S. Kennedy &Rachel Price Flum, Mail and Wire Fraud, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
817 (2002).
108. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 904.
109. Id.
110. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1106 (amending 15 U.S.C.A § 78ff(a) (2002)).
111. Id.
112. In 1984, Congress addressed the issue of fairness in sentencing by passing the Sentencing
Reform Act. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). This Act created a new federal agency, the
United States Sentencing Commission (the "Sentencing Commission"), which was instructed to
develop uniform guidelines for sentencing in federal cases. The guidelines were to be fair so that
similar offenders convicted of similar crimes would receive similar sentences. The original
guidelines became effective November 1, 1987, and apply to all federal felonies and most serious
misdemeanors. See generally United States Sentencing Commission Guideline Overview, at
http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2007). The Guidelines re-
quired a sentencing judge to choose a sentence from within a guideline range unless the court
identified a factor that the Sentencing Commission failed to consider that should result in a
different sentence. Sentences outside the guideline range were subject to review by the courts of
appeal for an abuse of discretion, and all sentences could be reviewed for incorrect application
of the relevant guidelines or law. Id.
The Guidelines were created to take into account both the seriousness of the criminal offense
and the offender's criminal history. Since their creation, courts, as well as prosecutors, were
required to arrive at a purportedly fair and consistent sentencing range for an offender by first
determining the so-called offense level for the criminal offense charged. See generally id.
The Guidelines assign one of 43 offense levels to most federal crimes based on the severity of
the offense type - the more serious the crime, the higher the "base offense" level. Each offense
type typically also carries with it a number of "specific offense characteristics." These enumer-
ated factors vary from offense to offense, and may either increase, or decrease the base offense
level (and perhaps the sentence an offender ultimately receives). There also are "categories of
adjustments" (such as victim-related adjustments, offender's role in the crime, and obstruction of
justice), which can either increase, or decrease the offense level. The judge could, as a final step
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preme Court's recent decision on the constitutionality of the Guide-
lines.113 Congress required the Sentencing Commission to construct
sentences that would adequately deter and punish obstruction of jus-
tice, extensive criminal fraud, and certain white-collar offenses (in-
cluding securities and accounting fraud); and ensure that a specific
enhancement would be provided for a "fraud offense that endangers
the solvency or financial security of a substantial number of vic-
tims. '1 14  These amendments were ordered notwithstanding earlier
amendments to the Guidelines that were enacted in connection with
the comprehensive "Economic Crime Package of 2001,"'115 which
towards determining the offense level, decrease a defendant's offense level by at least two
notches if, in his or her opinion, the offender has accepted responsibility for the crime. See id.
Courts (and other participants) also had to determine the so-called criminal history category
since the point at which the offense level and criminal history category intersect on the sentenc-
ing table determined an offender's sentencing range. To that end, each offender is also assigned
to one of six criminal history categories based upon the extent and how recently the crimes took
place. Category I is assigned to the least serious criminal record and is typically used for first
time offenders, while Category VI is the most serious category, used for offenders with lengthy
criminal records. Guideline sentences subjected a defendant to a minimum sentencing range of
zero to six months, or a maximum range of 360 months to life imprisonment. See id.
113. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the Guidelines are uncon-
stitutional because they violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be tried by a jury by
giving judges the power to make factual findings that increased sentences beyond the maximum
that the jury's findings alone would support. The Court, thereafter, held that federal judges
should consider the so-called "mandatory" Guidelines merely as a suggestion.) Consequently,
Booker effectively returns total discretion on sentencing to judges, many of whom will still look
to the existing Guidelines for guidance when sentencing offenders.
114. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 805, 905, 1104. See also United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, Existing Guideline §2B1.1(b)(2)
(Dec. 20, 2002); United States Sentencing Commission, Supplement to the 2002 Guidelines Man-
ual, Amended Guideline §2B1.1(b)(12) (January 25, 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2002
suppa/2bl-1.htm; News Release, "Sentencing Commission Toughens Penalties for White Collar
Fraudster," U.S. Sentencing Commission (April 18, 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
PRESS/re10403.htm; 2003 Guideline Amendments Sent to Congress (May 2003), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/GUIDELIN.HTM. The amended Guidelines, which were sent to Congress
in May 2003, took effect on November 1, 2003. See News Release, Sentencing Commission
Toughens Penalties for White Collar Fraudster, U.S. Sentencing Commission (April 18, 2003),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/re0403.htm
115. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,510, 30,540 (June 6,
2001). See also U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Commission stiffens Penalties for White
Collar Criminals, at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel010803.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007). The
"Economic Crime Package of 2001" provided for: (1) a consolidation of the theft, property,
destruction, and fraud guidelines; (2) a revised, common loss table for the consolidated guide-
line, and a similar table for tax offenses; (3) a revised, common definition of loss for the consoli-
dated guideline; (4) revisions to guidelines that refer to the loss table in the consolidated
guideline; (5) technical and conforming amendments; and (6) amendments regarding tax loss.
The most significant change in the Fraud and Theft Guideline is the modification of the loss table
to engender "substantial increases in penalties" for those offenders whose criminal conduct re-
sulted in "moderate and higher loss amounts." Id. It is noteworthy that the terms of imprison-
ment imposed after implementation of these changes are not longer than those previously
2007] CULTURE OF UNDER-ENFORCEMENT
were designed to address "high-dollar frauds or thefts" and "sentenc-
ing disparities between theft, fraud, tax offenses and property
destruction. "116
This time, perhaps, Congress thought it better to focus on the harm
caused by the breach of trust, rather than on the criminal offense per-
petrated. For example, where the offense tends to harm a large num-
ber of victims,1 17 or "endanger[s] the solvency or financial security of
a substantial number of victims"1' 18 the terms of imprisonment would
be greater. 1 9 Stated differently, the SarbOx amendments could pro-
vide for a 50 percent increase in the term of imprisonment if the of-
fense involved a violation of securities law and the offender was, at
the time of the offense, an officer or director of a publicly traded cor-
poration.12 0 All tolled, these changes purportedly will yield "tough,
but fair sentences and additional deterrence for these types of
crimes."' 121 However, (as will be discussed more fully below) even if
the courts embrace the SarbOx Guidelines, a wholehearted sole reli-
ance on the effectiveness of high fines and increased terms of impris-
onment to deter white collar criminals from seeking unlawful
exponential gains is debatable from a crime and punishment
standpoint.
imposed for some economic crimes that could have been charged as money laundering offenses.
See discussion infra.
116. The economic crime package, inter alia, consolidated three separate guidelines covering
theft, property destruction, and fraud into one guideline, Section 2B1.1, which covers "a wide
range of criminal conduct proscribed in over 260 federal criminal statutes," including securities
fraud (18 U.S.C. §. 1348 (2002)), and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. §. 1344 (2002)). See id.
117. See United States Sentencing Commission, Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines, Existing Guideline §2B1.1(b)(2) (December 20, 2002). A sample of fraud offenders
sentenced in 2001 revealed that almost half (42.5 percent) of the securities fraud cases involved
50 or more individuals, while over one quarter (25.7 percent) involved 250 or more victims. See
United States Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Increased Penalties Under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [hereinafter "Report"], at 2-3 (Jan. 2003) available at http://www
.ussc.gov/r congress/S-Oreport.pdf.
118. See United States Sentencing Commission, Supplement to the 2002 Guidelines Manual,
Amended Guideline §2B1.1(b)(12) (January 25, 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2002
suppa2bl.htm. See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 805(a)(4),
1104(b)(1), 116 Stat. 804 (2002).
119. See Report, supra note 117, at 11 ("For example, the guideline sentence for a defendant
who causes more than $400,000,000 in loss previously was 121 to 151 months (assuming no other
sentencing enhancements apply). With the additional loss categories, the guideline sentence will
be 188 to 235 months, an increase of more than five years.").
120. A conviction under a securities law is not required in order for this subsection to apply.
See United States Sentencing Commission, Supplement to the 2002 Guidelines Manual, Applica-
tion of Subsection (b)(13) (January 25, 2003) available at http://www.ussc.gov/2002suppa/2bl_1
.htm.
121. See News Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Commission Toughens Pen-
alties for White Collar Fraudster (April 18, 2003) (emphasis supplied), available at http:/lwww
.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0403.htm.
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C. The Presumptive Impact of the Act's Enhanced
Criminal Penalties
Congress stopped short of providing sufficient deterrence because
SarbOx's criminal measures focus almost exclusively on long prison
sentences and increased fines. The politicians appear to rely on the
notion that potential offenders will be deterred from engaging in
wrongdoing because they will fear longer terms of incarceration. This
rationale relies on a faulty assumption: that these lengthy terms of
imprisonment and high fines actually will be meted out. Numerous
variables play a role in determining the actual sentence imposed by
the courts, including the now advisory nature of the Guidelines which
enables greater judicial discretion in sentencing offenders.
Prosecutorial discretion plays a significant role in the sentences im-
posed. 122 Federal prosecutors continue to have enormous discretion
whether in choosing the applicable legal theories (aided by the vague-
ness of many federal statutes), or in manipulating the number of
counts charged under that particular legal theory. Such charging tac-
tics previously have been employed to obtain a desired sentencing
range, or even the plea agreement.123 Prosecutors also could manipu-
late the sentences by threatening to withhold requests to the sentenc-
122. See Michael Higgins, Sizing up Sentence, 85 A.B.A. J. 42, 44 (1999) ("The guidelines give
prosecutors leeway on who to charge.... [how] to classify the amount of money at issue in a case
... which charges to bring, and which to leave for state authorities. And there are questions of
when a defendant will be credited with substantial assistance for aiding a prosecution... "). See
generally Kirby D. Behre, A. Jeff Ifrah, Courts Not Soft on Fraud, Theft Crimes, NAT'L L.J., at
A27 (Mar. 10, 2003). The indictment of Lea Fastow serves as an example of the prosecutors'
discretion. She was indicted on six felony counts (including conspiracy to commit wire fraud,
conspiracy to commit money laundering, and false tax return filing), but was allowed to plead
guilty to one misdemeanor tax charge. Cf Indictment, U.S. v. Lea W. Fastow (S.D. Tex. 2003)
(Cr. No. H-03-150); Plea Agreement, U.S. v. Lea W. Fastow (S.D. Tex. 2004) (Cr. No. H-03-150).
To support the reduced charges, the government argued that it was justified by reason of Lea
Fastow's help in securing her husband's cooperation; the couple's agreement to forfeit more than
$23 million in assets; and the additional cost savings in avoiding trial. Mary Flood, Lea Fastow
Expresses "Regret" at Sentencing, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 19, 2005.
123. See Robert G. Morvillo, Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in
the Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137 (1995) (arguing that legislation like,
inter alia, the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968; the Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848; the Criminal Forfeitures Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 853; the Money Laundering Control Act ("MLCA"), 18U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957, have given "pros-
ecutors greater leverage to virtually compel plea bargaining, force cooperation, and in essence
determine the length of sentences.").
[Vol. 5:321
CULTURE OF UNDER-ENFORCEMENT
ing judges for downward departures from the Guidelines. 124 Rarely
will courts intervene with respect to the prosecutors' decisions. 25
As a case in point, Enron's Andrew Fastow was indicted on 109
counts of fraud, money laundering, and insider trading, among others,
in connection with the scheme that led to the eventual collapse of En-
ron.126 Without the benefit of SarbOx, Fastow faced more than one
hundred years in prison before he pleaded guilty in January 2004 to
only two criminal counts: conspiracy to commit wire fraud and con-
spiracy to commit securities fraud. 127 Pursuant to his plea agreement,
however, Fastow was expected to forfeit more than $29 million and to
serve a ten-year prison if he cooperated with the government in build-
ing its case against other Enron senior officials. 128 Astonishingly, Fas-
tow was sentenced to six years in prison 129 - quite a departure from
his initial exposure.
Another shortcoming of SarbOx's enhanced criminal penalties is
that they address only the maximum allowable fines and sentences for
each violation. Sentencing judges had, and continue to have, discre-
tion to impose lower fines or lesser prison sentences. 130 Indeed, even
before the Supreme Court's ruling in Booker that the Sentencing
Guidelines were merely advisory,' 3 ' the Guidelines themselves pro-
vided support for reduced sentences by authorizing judges to engage
in downward departures to lessen the sentence range under certain
circumstances. 132
124. See Kirby D. Behre, A. Jeff lfrah, Courts Not Soft on Fraud, Theft Crimes, NAT'L L.J., at
A27 (Mar. 10, 2003) (noting that in 2000, "two-thirds of all departures granted nationwide re-
sulted from recommendations made by prosecutors that the sentencing judge depart downward
for 'substantial assistance"').
125. See United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating "the
Guidelines do not give courts the authority to interfere with a prosecutor's exercise of discretion
in charging [defendants]"); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1437 (10th Cir. 1995) (stat-
ing "Charging decisions are primarily a matter of discretion for the prosecution"). See also Chris
Zimmerman, Prosecutorial Discretion, 89 GEO. L. J. 1229, 1230-31 n.636-37 (2001); Stephanos
Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining And Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 721
(2005).
126. See discussion supra note 17.
127. See supra note 21.
128. See supra note 21.
129. Kate Murphy & Alexei Barrionuevo, Fastow Sentenced to 6 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2006, at Cl.
130. See Kirby D. Behre & A. Jeff Ifrah, Courts Not Soft on Fraud, Theft Crimes, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 10, 2003, at A27.
131. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
132. For a detailed discussion of downward departures from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
and the ensuing impact of such actions, see Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Eco-
nomic Crime Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 359 (2003); Jon
J. Lambiras, White-Collar Crime: Why the Sentencing Disparity Despite Uniform Guidelines? 30
PEPP. L. REV. 459 (2003).
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Finally, federal judges (unlike politicians who are elected officials)
have lifetime appointments. They, as a result, may not be compelled
by public pressure to impose the harsher terms of imprisonment - par-
ticularly if the judges believe that such sentences are politically moti-
vated rather than rational under traditional notions of punishment, 133
or if they favor alternatives to incarceration.1 34 As a result of these
sentencing variables, reliance solely on the possibility of increased
terms of imprisonment and fines to enhance the laws' deterrent effect
is misplaced. Arguably, the inclusion of an asset forfeiture penalty, on
the other hand, would strengthen the Act's overall deterrent impact.
IV. SARBOX'S DISGORGEMENT AND ASSET FREEZE PROVISIONS
Congress appeared willing to take a heavier hand in sanctioning
corporate executives who were associated with public companies re-
quired to restate their financials due to accounting irregularities; how-
ever, they stopped short. Instead, Congress enacted only limited
disgorgement and asset freeze legislation. Specifically, the first of the
two executive compensation provisions relates to the forfeiture of
CEO and CFO bonuses.135 The second relates to the U.S. Securities
and Commission's authority to apply for a temporary freeze of pro-
posed payments to suspected wrongdoers. 136
Section 304 (the "claw back" provision) requires the CEO and CFO
of any public company that is required to restate its financial state-
ments as a result of financial misconduct to disgorge to the company
"any profits realized from the sale" of that company's securities and
"any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation re-
ceived" during the "12-month period following the first public issu-
ance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the
financial document. '137 The SEC is authorized to exempt any person
from this provision as it deems "necessary and appropriate." 138
Correspondingly, Section 1103 (the "bonus freeze" provision) pro-
vides SEC with temporary asset freeze authority in those cases where
any "extraordinary payments (whether compensation or otherwise)"
are proposed to be made by the company to any of its directors, of-
133. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 416 (2003).
134. See Jon J. Lambiras, White-Collar Crime: Why the Sentencing Disparity Despite Uniform
Guidelines? 30 PEPP. L. REV. 459, 505-509 (2003).
135. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116 Stat. 804 (2002) (creat-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 7243).
136. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1103 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)).
137. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304(a)(1).
138. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304(b).
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ficers, and certain other affiliated parties during the course of an in-
vestigation of the company for possible securities law violations. 39
Congress requires the SEC to petition a federal district court for such
an order, and the order will be effective for up to 45 days (subject to
an additional 45-day extension). 140 If the individual affected by the
order is charged with a securities law violation within the time period
covered by the order, the escrow of such payments can continue, sub-
ject to court approval, until the conclusion of any legal proceeding.141
The Senate, during its debate on the claw back provision, noted
"Recent events have raised concerns about management benefiting
from unsound financial statements, many of which ultimately result in
corporate restatements."'142 Although Congress clearly intended to
remove the profit motive from corporate executives who engage in
mismanagement to unjustly enrich themselves, these provisions do not
go as far as the more general asset forfeiture provisions that will be
discussed in Part V of this article. Moreover, there are gaping holes in
these provisions that may impact their enforcement.
First, section 304's claw back provision reaches only the bonuses
(and not the salaries purportedly earned) for the particular period tied
to the restated financials. All compensation awarded during the pe-
riod in question should be subject to forfeiture, with the burden on the
manager to prove otherwise. Second, section 304's limited forfeiture
exposure might cause the CEOs and CFOs to resist restating the
financials - or, at least delay such action during the period in which
they could lose the most money. Such inaction could lead to greater
losses to investors who are ignorant of simmering problems within the
corporation. Moreover, it is unclear from the language of the statute
who can sue to enforce the claw back provision. Can investors sue on
behalf of the corporation to make the CEOs and CFOs return the
funds to the corporation? Finally, it is also unclear from the language
of the statute whose misconduct will trigger the disgorgement, and
even what is the nature of the misconduct that will serve as the trigger.
There are also concerns with respect to the asset freeze provision.
While section 1103 does permit the SEC to seek a temporary asset
freeze, such an action will apply only to proposed corporate payments
to the alleged wrongdoer during the period of the SEC's investigation.
It is not retroactive and, therefore, does not reach payments made
139. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1103(a)(3)(A)(i).
140. Id. See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 1103(a)(3)(A)(iii)-(iv).
141. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1103(a)(3)(B)(i).
142. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 26 (2002).
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before the alleged fraud is discovered. The sooner the executive's as-
sets are frozen, the easier it is to avoid the dissipation of assets.
Moreover, the 45- to 90-day freeze period is particularly limiting.
The very nature of white collar crime presupposes that any investiga-
tion or ensuing prosecution will take some time. The government
rarely will be in a position to charge a white collar defendant within a
45- to 90-day time period. It took almost three years to indict Enron's
Kenneth Lay. If Congress was really serious about taking the profit
out of corporate fraud, it would have gone a step further and also
enacted legislation allowing for both civil and criminal forfeiture of all
assets involved in, or traceable to, the corporate accounting fraud.
V. ASSET FORFEITURE: THE "SANCTION THAT GOT AWAY"
In its effort to combat rising lawlessness in decades past, Congress
enacted enhanced criminal penalties that included not only increased
prison sentences and fines, but also asset forfeiture provisions. 143 As-
set forfeiture reaches the spoils of the wrongdoer's illegal conduct,
and strikes at the heart of the criminal's economic motive for misusing
his corporate status. The failure to include this additional penalty in
the Act's criminal measures effectively allows the corporate fraudster
to escape exposure to a tried and true method of punishment.
A. Asset Forfeiture in Other Contexts
Forfeiture is a comprehensive term which refers to "[t]he divestiture
of property without compensation" to the owner.144 Applied in the
context of punishment, it is
the legal process by which property[,] which was used unlawfully, or
is the product of criminal activity, is seized and its title vested in the
government: state, local or federal. 145
No general forfeiture law exists. Each federal crime must have its
own forfeiture provision written into the law. Today, there are more
than 200 federal statutes which authorize a forfeiture sanction. 146
Most forfeiture actions in non-drug cases, however, proceed under ei-
143. See discussion infra.
144. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Asset forfeiture is not the same as restitution,
which is an equitable remedy by which a person is restored to his or her original position prior to
the loss or injury. See discussion infra.
145. Anthony G. Hall, Q&A on Recovering the Proceeds of Crime/Forfeiting the Instrumentali-
ties of Crime, 42 ADVOCATE 16 (Dec. 1999).
146. See DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS, (ABA Publishing) (2004); Craig Peyton Gaumer, When Two Worlds
Collide: The Relationship and Conflicts Between Asset Forfeiture and Coordinator, AM. BANKR.
INST. J. May 2002, at 10.
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ther section 981 of title 18 of the United States Code, which governs
civil asset forfeiture actions, or section 982 of the same, which governs
criminal asset forfeiture actions.
Asset forfeitures, by way of background, are deeply rooted in
American history. The government's seizure of property used in, or
derived from, a crime dates back to the Crown. Its use was based on
the theory that a breach of common law, an offense to the King's
peace, should deprive the transgressor of the right to own property.147
During the seventeenth century, American colonial courts enforced
English and local civil forfeiture statutes. One of the early acts of the
First U.S. Congress following the ratification of the Constitution, in
fact, was its enactment of forfeiture statutes for vessels and cargo in-
volved in customs violations. 148
Congress re-introduced the asset forfeiture sanction in 1970 in an
effort to combat the rising drug trade and crime waves led by organ-
ized crime gangs. In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 49 which authorized drug-related
asset forfeiture. 150  In order to wage the war on drugs, Congress
sought to strike at the economic roots of the drug trade by divesting
drug kingpins of their operating capital and profit. The range of for-
feitable property expanded over the years to include all proceeds of a
controlled substance transaction, whether direct or indirect, as well as
all real property, moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used
or intended for use in the facilitation of the drug violation.151
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (hereinafter "RICO")
and related statutes 152 similarly authorized criminal asset forfeiture
147. William W. Taylor, III, Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 - RICO's Most Powerful
Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379, 382 (1980). See also David Benjamin Ross, Comment, Civil
Forfeitures: A Fiction That Offends Due Process, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 259, 261 (2000-2001).
148. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
149. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codifying civil asset forfeiture at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881).
150. Civil asset forfeiture of drug-related property is authorized pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(b), which provides for forfeiture in the manner set forth in section.981(b) of Title 18 of the
United States Code. Drug-related criminal asset forfeiture also is authorized. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(a). Section 853 of Title 21, United States Code, calls for the forfeiture of property consti-
tuting, or derived from drug offenses, or used to commit or facilitate the commission of drug
offenses. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a). The statutory definition of "property" potentially subject to forfei-
ture is very broad and includes "real property, including things growing on, affixed to and found
in land," and "tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests,
claims and securities." 21 U.S.C. § 853(b).
151. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a).
152. See Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, commonly referred to as
"Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" ("RICO"), Pub. L. No. 91-452, §901, 84 Stat.
941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68, and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statutes, 21
U.S.C. §§ 848. The Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute was enacted as part of the Compre-
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for any offender who violates RICO section 1962.153 In so legislating,
Congress sought to expand efforts to combat organized crime's cor-
ruption of American businesses. It concluded that courts needed a
means of wrestling economic control over the victimized business
from the convicted racketeer; noting that too often incarcerating or
fining defendants had little or no effect on their ability to run the busi-
ness.154 To that end, federal prosecutors, armed with RICO section
1963(a)(1), could obtain the forfeiture of "any interest the person has
acquired or maintained [both tangible and intangible] in violation of
[the prohibited activities of] section 1962." 155 However, since RICO
forfeiture actions are in personam actions, the defendant must first be
convicted of a RICO violation before any forfeiture can be ordered.
The RICO conviction requires proof that the defendant used the pro-
ceeds of racketeering activity to acquire control of an enterprise, or
used the racketeering activity to acquire or maintain control of an en-
terprise or to conduct its affairs.' 56 It also requires proof that the de-
fendant committed the two predicate acts, that those acts were part of
a pattern, and that they had a particular impact upon the enterprise. 157
Consequently, use of this asset forfeiture provision may be limited
when applied outside a narrow class of wrongdoers.158
Asset forfeiture also is authorized in money laundering cases. Al-
though the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 ("MLCA")159 was
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat.
1276 (1970).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)-(b).
154. S. REP. No. 91-617, at 78-79 (1969). See also William W. Taylor, III, Forfeiture Under 18
U.S.C. § 1963 - RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 379 (1980).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1). Section 1962(c), the most popular provision employed in white-
collar cases, makes it unlawful for "any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate ... commerce, to conduct or participate
... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ...." 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c).
156. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962. The "pattern of racketeering activity" element requires at least two
of over 143 enumerated state and federal offenses be committed within ten years of each other,
and related in a common scheme. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The "enterprise" is defined to include
familiar legal entities: individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, or other legal enti-
ties, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. See 18
U.S.C. § 1961(4).
157. See id.
158. This author does not mean to suggest that RICO statutes cannot be applied to white
collar criminals. For an analysis of how RICO can be applied, see L. Gordon Crovitz, How the
Rico Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1050 (1990). See also Michael A.
DiMedio, A Deterrence Theory Analysis of Corporate Rico Liability For "Fraud In The Sale Of
Securities," 1 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 (1994).
159. Pub. L. No. 99-570, Title I, Subtitle H, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957).
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originally conceived as anti-drug legislation, 160 prosecutors typically
rely upon its broad language and accompanying penalties to impose
criminal liability on a variety of non-drug related wrongdoers (includ-
ing white collar criminals).' 6' Section 981 authorizes the civil asset
forfeiture of property (real or personal) involved in, or traceable to,
violations of the federal money laundering statutes, 162 among others,
while section 982 authorizes the criminal asset forfeiture of property
(real or personal) involved in, or traceable to, a money laundering
offense.t 63
More recently, Congress employed the asset forfeiture sanction in
response to the wave of insider trading scandals that marred Wall
Street during the 1980s, as well as the savings and loan debacle of the
1980s and 90s. In each case, Congress enacted specific legislation de-
signed to remove the economic motives of corporate insiders and
bank fiduciaries who misuse, or foster the misuse of, their trusted po-
sitions for illegal gains. Congress adopted the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (hereinafter "FIRREA") 164
in an effort to combat future savings and loan scandals. Viewing
banking crimes as grave, Congress enhanced the existing criminal pen-
alties to make those assets involved in, or traceable to, violations of
banking crime statutes subject to both criminal and civil forfeitures,
rather than only increasing the potential terms of imprisonment.1 65
Not only did it amend sections 981 and 982 to require asset forfeitures
by violators of the bank fraud and other banking crime statutes, but
Congress also made bank fraud a predicate offense under the federal
160. The Money Laundering Control Act is a subset of the Anti-Drug Legislations of 1986.
Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del), upon introducing a bill (S. 2683) which through subsequent
amendments became law, noted, "Money laundering is a crucial financial underpinning of organ-
ized crime and narcotics trafficking [who] need money laundering to conceal the billions of dol-
lars in cash generated annually in drug sales ..... " S. 2682, 99th Cong., 132 CONG. REC. 17571-72
(1986).
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)-(2), (c)(7)(A). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-982.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(C).
163. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1).
164. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (hereinafter "FIR-
REA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 963, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). FIRREA is directed towards bank
bribery, embezzlement, false statements, mail and wire fraud in connection with banks and sav-
ings and loan institutions. Congress also enacted the Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud
Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990, as part of the Crime Control Act. Crime Con-
trol Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990).
165. See FIRREA § 963 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 982(a)(3)-(4)). These amendments
provided for direct criminal forfeiture of proceeds. However, these provisions are limited to
cases involving specified crimes that affect financial institutions.
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racketeering statute ("RICO"), 166 thus ensuring that asset forfeiture
would be ordered for convicted wrongdoers.
This approach had been similarly employed years earlier when Con-
gress sought to combat rampant insider trading on Wall Street. At the
time, it enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act ("ITSA") 167 and
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act ("IT-
SFEA") 168 to combat the abuse of trust by insiders. Again, Congress
targeted their economic motives and authorized the recovery of treble
damages for profits gained and losses avoided. 169 In other words, vio-
lators were made to disgorge (as a monetary penalty) treble profits
unlawfully gained, or those losses avoided by wrongdoers who traded
while in possession of material nonpublic information obtained in
breach of a fiduciary duty. As the aforementioned illustrates, Con-
gress' failure to enact asset forfeiture legislation following the wave of
corporate accounting frauds that occurred earlier this century is a
striking departure from its past responses to criminal wrongdoing.
B. Procedural Requirements
The government can maintain only two types of asset forfeiture ac-
tions. The first, a civil asset forfeiture action, is an in rem action where
jurisdiction is found not over a specific individual but over the prop-
erty, based on the legal fiction that the property is guilty of wrongdo-
ing. In this instance, the property becomes a party to the litigation.
The other type is the criminal forfeiture action which is an in per-
sonam action, meaning that such an action requires the property
owner's conviction before the government can proceed against that
person's property. Civil and criminal asset forfeiture also differ in
three other key respects: (1) the point in the proceeding at which the
property may be seized; (2) the burden of proof necessary to confis-
cate property; and (3) the type of property interests that can be
forfeited. 170
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). See also FIRREA § 968, 103 Stat. at 506.
167. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
168. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
169. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2007).
170. For a detailed discussion of asset forfeiture, see DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEI-
TURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, (ABA Publishing) (2004).
See also Arthur W. Leach & John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to
the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241 (1994).
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1. Civil Asset Forfeiture Actions
The passage of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
("CAFRA"), 171 while expanding the number of federal statutes under
which the government can seek civil asset forfeiture, 172 also signifi-
cantly limited the government's ability to obtain asset forfeiture. 73
Civil asset forfeiture actions nevertheless offer the government
greater flexibility in obtaining the so-called tainted property than
would criminal forfeiture actions, which first require the defendant
owner's conviction. In other words, civil asset forfeiture can be used
as a pre-indictment tool. The civil action also can be effected through
either a judicial or an administrative proceeding. The forfeited prop-
erty is subject to seizure pursuant to a warrant secured through the
same process required for the issuance of a search warrant under Rule
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 174 The property can
be seized without even charging the owner with wrongdoing.
The burden of proof necessary to obtain the forfeiture order is also
lower since the government need only prove by a preponderance of
evidence that the property, or its proceeds, has been used in criminal
activity.' 75 The Government also may use evidence gathered after the
filing of a complaint for forfeiture to establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that property is subject to forfeiture, thus negating the
dismissal of any civil forfeiture complaint because the government
lacked sufficient evidence of forfeitability at the time of filing.176 If
the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to
commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was in-
volved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall
establish that there was a substantial connection between the property
and the offense.' 77
171. 106 Pub. L. No. 185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000).
172. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c).
173. For example, CAFRA added Section 983 to Chapter 46 of Title 18 of the United States
Code, which shifted the burden of proof to the government in any "action brought under any
civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property." 18 U.S.C. § 983(c). The govern-
ment must establish by a preponderance of evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.
Id. CAFRA also codifies an innocent owner defense, with the claimant bearing the burden of
proof, in civil asset forfeiture matters. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d). See discussion infra.
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(3).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). See also United States v. Lopez-Burgos, 435 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006)
(observing that CAFRA added 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) to increase "the government's burden of
proof at trial from mere probable cause (the old standard) to the preponderance of the evidence
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(D); see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(2).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).
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Once established, the burden shifts to the party seeking to retain
the property to prove - by a preponderance of evidence - that the
property is not subject to forfeiture. 178 The government is given either
actual or constructive possession of the property and retains custody
of that property pending resolution of the litigation once a civil asset
forfeiture order is obtained. Moreover, the "relation back" doctrine
allows the government's right of forfeiture to vest as of the time of the
illegal activity, rather than at the time that the government initiates or
prevails on the forfeiture action. 179
2. Criminal Asset Forfeiture Actions
Criminal asset forfeitures may be effected only through a judicial
process. As such, the criminal forfeiture action is a more limited
prosecutorial weapon. Property subject to a criminal forfeiture action
must be set forth in the same indictment or information that charges
the defendant with the underlying wrongdoing. The court's jurisdic-
tion over the defendant provides the court with jurisdiction over his
property. 180 The government must meet the legal standard of proof
necessary to convict the defendant, and then show by a preponder-
ance of evidence that the property was involved in, or traceable to, the
criminal activity before a criminal forfeiture order is granted. 81
Prosecutors can seek criminal forfeiture of all property traceable
directly or indirectly to the illegal activity, including all interest, divi-
dends, income or property derived from the original illegal transac-
tion, including the appreciated value of the property. 82 Thus, no
matter how many times the property changes form (e.g., from cash to
real estate to artwork to cash), it still will be subject to forfeiture. The
government, of course, bears burden of proof in tracing the forfeited
funds.18 3 The criminal forfeiture order also may be entered as a
178. The claimant can seek to prove that he or she is an "innocent owner" by a preponderance
of evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1).
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(f). The relation back doctrine provides that property subject to for-
feiture vests in the government at the time of the felonious act giving rise to forfeiture.
180. Unlike civil forfeiture orders that focus on particular property (without regard to owner-
ship), criminal forfeiture orders may be directed against all property held by the convicted of-
fender that is connected to the wrongdoing.
181. See United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1083 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Upton, 352
F. Supp. 2d 92, 99 (D. Mass. 2005)
182. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1).
183. United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1087 (3d Cir. 1996), United States v. Day, 416 F.
Supp. 2d 79, 89-91 (D. D.C. 2006).
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money judgment, directly against the defendant's assets when the
original forfeited property cannot be located.184
The procedure for obtaining criminal forfeitures under section 982
is governed by the rules set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 853.185 Section 853
also allows federal courts, upon application of the United States, to
enter a restraining order or injunction or take other action to preserve
the availability of property for forfeiture. 186 Such an order can be en-
tered, for cause shown and with certain limits, both before and after
an indictment or information has been filed. If a restraining order
''may not be sufficient to assure the availability of the property for
forfeiture," the court may, if requested, issue a warrant authorizing
the seizure of the property. 87
Once the conviction has been entered, the district court shall issue a
seizure order as warranted.' 88 It is the jury's responsibility (generally
in a bifurcated proceeding and by special verdict form) to determine
whether each specific asset was in fact connected to the criminal viola-
tion.18 9 A separate proceeding must be held to determine the rights of
third parties since the forfeiture adjudicates only the interest of the
person convicted. 190
C. Asset Forfeiture Criticisms - Generally
Much of the criticisms of forfeiture actions stem from the govern-
ment's use of civil asset forfeitures; many argue that forfeitures are a
draconian form of punishment that hurt innocent parties and that its
use is subject to abuse.191 The chief criticisms relate to concerns about
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' notice and due process re-
184. See United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 42 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v.
Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir. 1996). Substitute property may be forfeited in lieu of traceable
property if the government meets the requisites of 21 U.S.C. § 8 5 3 (p).
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1), which provides that "[tihe forfeiture of property under this
section... shall be governed by the provisions of section 413 (other than subsection (d) of that
section) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C.
§ 853)."
186. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e).
187. Id.
188. Forfeiture orders are imposed in addition to fines and incarceration.
189. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b).
190. See Fed. R. Crim P. 32.2(b)(3). Any party who claims to have an interest in the property
subject to forfeiture is not permitted to intervene in the action, or initiate proceedings against
the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1).
191. See generally Arthur W. Leach & John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate
Solution to the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241 (1994); David Benjamin Ross,
Civil Forfeiture: A Fiction that Offends Due Process, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 259 (2001); Barclay
Thomas Johnson, Restoring Civility - The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps
Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045 (2002).
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quirements, the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel privilege, and the
Eighth Amendment's bar against excessive punishments. The Su-
preme Court's decisions in this area, as well as the CAFRA amend-
ments have rendered many of the constitutional and procedural
concerns moot.
The Supreme Court dealt with the Eighth Amendment 192 concerns
in the 1993 case of Alexander v. United States193 when it concluded
that criminal forfeiture under RICO section 1963 is no different than a
traditional fine and is therefore subject to the Eighth Amendment Ex-
cessive Fine Clause. Five years later, in United States v. Bajakajian the
Court held that criminal forfeitures under section 982 also were sub-
ject to the Excessive Fine Clause.194 In Bajakajian, the government
sought forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982 of the entire $357,144 ex-
ported by a defendant who failed to declare that he was leaving the
country with more than $10,000 in cash.195 Despite analyzing the for-
feiture order on the theory of proportionality - the "forfeiture must
bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed
to punish"'196 - the Court limited the forfeiture order, finding that a
punitive forfeiture would be unconstitutional if the forfeiture is
"grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense. '197
In any event, the application of forfeiture orders in high-dollar,
multiple victim, white-collar fraud cases rarely should raise concerns
as such forfeiture will usually be deemed proportional. 198 Moreover,
numerous safeguards have been enacted with the passage of
192. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
193. 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
194. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). The Court determined that a fine is
a "payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense," and that forfeitures (as payments in
kind) are fines if they are imposed as punishment for the offense. Id. at 327-28. It concluded
that the forfeitures were considered to be fines within the meaning of the Excessive Fines
Clause. Id. at 328.
195. Id.at 324.
196. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
197. Id. The Court held that the "full forfeiture of respondent's currency would violate the
Excessive Fine Clause."
198. In other words, proceeds forfeitures should not be deemed excessive since they are reme-
dial; the government merely seeks to take away the illicit profits from the defendant that he had
no legal right to possess. See, e.g., United States v. Loe, 248 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Real Property Located at 22 Santa Barbara Drive, 264 F.3d 860, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001).
Cf United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (Such actions can raise Double Jeopardy con-
cerns where the defendant was charged in a related civil action after he was convicted of Medi-
care fraud, sentenced to prison and fined. In that case, the court held that the civil action is
punishment if it can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes
(rather than being merely remedial). But see Double Jeopardy discussion infra.
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CAFRA, t 99 which provides procedures that courts must follow in de-
termining whether the forfeiture is constitutionally excessive.200
Civil asset forfeiture orders also are similarly subject to the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fine Clause.201 The Court in Austin noted that
civil forfeitures are partly designed to punish, as they are "payment to
a sovereign as punishment for some offense... ,,,20 but chose not to
set forth a standard for determining when the punishment was exces-
sive, stating instead that "[p]rudence dictates that we allow lower
courts to consider the question in the first instance. °20 3
The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy 2°4 argument also should be
inapplicable to civil forfeitures. In United States v. Usery,205 the Su-
preme Court held that civil forfeitures do not constitute "punishment"
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy clause, 20 6 without regard to
whether the forfeiture is disproportionate to the harm suffered by the
government.20 7 The Court noted that such orders serve a non-puni-
tive function of disgorgement. 20 8
Defendants have also argued that forfeiture orders also violate their
Sixth Amendment right to counsel because such orders disadvantage
the defendants who were unable to retain effective counsel as a result
of the freeze of their assets. They assert that attorneys will not take
cases knowing that their legal fees may be forfeitable, thereby causing
such criminal defendants to rely on court-appointed counsel.20 9 One
could further argue that claimants (including innocent third parties)
were similarly affected since they could obtain appointed counsel in
civil forfeiture actions only under limited circumstances. 210
199. 106 Pub. L. No. 185, 114 Stat. 202, 209-10.
200. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(1).
201. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
202. Id. at 622. Specifically, the Court held that "forfeiture generally and statutory in rem
forfeiture in particular, historically have been understood, at least in part, as punishment." Id. at
618.
203. Id. at 622-23. (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining the test of excessiveness should focus
"not [on] how much the confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has
a close enough relationship to the offense.") Id. at 628 (emphasis omitted).
204. The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents multiple punishments for the same offense. U.S.
CONST. amend V.
205. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
206. Id. at 292.
207. Id. at 274.
208. Id. at 284.
209. See generally Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum Of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking
A Consistent Approach To The Constitutional Rights Of Corporations In Criminal Prosecutions,
63 Tenn. L. Rev. 793, 881-885 (1996).
210. See generally Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits On Successive
And Excessive Penalties, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 162-63, n. 188(1995)
20071
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However, the Court has held - in both Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered211 and Monsanto212 - that the defendants had no right to
hire counsel using monies that the government has claimed forfeited.
In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court, applying Congress' relation-back
doctrine, held that "'[a]ll right, title and interest in property' obtained
by criminals via the illicit means described in the statute 'vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to the forfei-
ture."' 21 3 The defendant, therefore, could not use property belonging
to the government for the purpose of hiring counsel.21 4 Similarly, in
Monsanto, the Court held that "neither the Fifth nor the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution requires Congress to permit a defen-
dant to use assets adjudged to be forfeitable to pay that defendant's
legal fees. '215
Moreover, any claimant must be appointed counsel, at the govern-
ment's expense, if a civil forfeiture claimant is financially unable to
obtain independent counsel, and is also being represented by ap-
pointed counsel in a related criminal case. 216 Appointed counsel also
is authorized if (i) the claimant has standing to challenge the forfei-
ture; (ii) the claimant is financially unable to obtain counsel; (iii) the
claimant requests counsel; and (iv) the forfeiture action concerns real
property used as the claimant's primary residence. 217
Finally, critics have assailed civil forfeiture orders because they vio-
late constitutional notice and due process protections.2 18 In a leading
civil forfeiture case, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,219
the Supreme Court in 1974 held that the government may seize prop-
erty for forfeiture without providing notice and a hearing when "ex-
traordinary" circumstances exist.220 The property in question, a yacht,
was properly seized even though no prior notice or hearing had been
provided because a yacht can easily be destroyed, concealed, or
moved beyond the jurisdiction of the court if the government is re-
211. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
212. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
213. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 491 U.S. at 627 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)).
214. Id. at 628.
215. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614.
216. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(A) (this remedy is provided by CAFRA).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A) (this remedy is provided by CAFRA).
218. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that the government may not deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law. In other words, a person has
the right to reasonable notice and an opportunity to contest forfeiture proceedings convened to
deprive him or her of his or her property rights. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV.
219. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
220. Id. at 678-79.
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quired to give advanced warning.221 Accordingly, the government's
failure to provide notice and hearing prior to seizure did not consti-
tute a denial of due process.222
On the other hand, the Court has also held that the seizure of real
property for forfeiture without prior notice, absent exigent circum-
stances, does violate the Due Process Clause because such property is
incapable of movement and the court's jurisdiction can be preserved
without prior seizure.223 Exigent circumstances, however, could be es-
tablished only by showing that "less restrictive measures, i.e., lis
pendens, restraining order, or a bond, would not protect the govern-
ment's interest in preventing the sale, destruction, or continued un-
lawful use of the real property. '224 While the Court in United States v.
Monsanto declined to decide whether a hearing is required under the
Due Process Clause before a court may impose such an order in the
case of a post-indictment, pre-trial criminal forfeiture restraining or-
der,225 CAFRA again provides that the government must initiate non-
judicial forfeiture actions "as soon as practicable" and no more than
60 days from the date of seizure. 226
While concerns may remain about a defendant or other claimant's
property rights, CAFRA and Court precedents have attempted to
lessen the harms caused. Reliance on the criminal forfeiture statute,
of course, will also minimize the chances for abuse and corruption
given the requirement of a defendant's conviction prior to any forfei-
ture action. Nevertheless, significant concerns will remain about giv-
ing prosecutors additional weapons, which have the potential for
abuse, even if those weapons will be used to combat corporate
fraud.227
221. Id.
222. Id. at 681.
223. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 57-59 (1993).
224. Id. at 62.
225. 491 U.S. 600, 615 n.10 (1989).
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A). Further, cases must be filed within the applicable statute
of limitations - i.e., five years from discovery of the offense or two years from the discovery of
the involvement of the property in the offense. 19 U.S.C. § 1621.
227. For a discussion of those significant concerns surrounding prosecutorial discretion, the
enforcement of criminal laws affecting white collar criminals, lack of accountability and the
abuse of power, see Ellen S. Podgor, Making 'Materiality' an Element of Obstruction of Justice, 29
CHAMPION 26 (2005) (observing how a charge of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C.§ 1512
has the potential to be abused by prosecutors who are unable to prove the underlying more
serious charge, and suggesting that "incorporating materiality as an element in obstruction stat-
utes limits prosecutorial discretion to using these charges in instances when it is material to the
investigation, but precluding its use when it would be inconsequential"); Ellen S. Podgor, Jose
Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who Should be Charged with Criminal Conduct?, 109 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1059 (2005) (observing how the prosecutors liberally charge "cover up" crimes, rather than
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VI. THE DETERRENT IMPACT OF ASSET FORFEITURE
Although couched in terms of "sentencing," according to the fed-
eral statute, there are four main goals of punishment:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law and to provide just punishment for the offense [a re-
tributive purpose];
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner. ' 228
Most legislators, however, view punishment solely in terms of foster-
ing deterrence, and satiating society's need for retribution. These now
dominant theories of punishment can be briefly described as follows:
The theory of general deterrence operates on the assumption that if
society punishes offenders who violate the law, others will not violate
the law because they do not wish to be punished.229 The retributive
theory of punishment, in contrast, focuses on making the offender pay
for breaching society's peace. Here, sanctions are imposed because it
is morally fitting that a person who does wrong will suffer in propor-
tion to his wrongdoing. 230
Congress apparently believed that exposure to higher fines and in-
creased terms of imprisonment would likely deter future violative be-
havior and adequately punish corporate fraudsters when it enacted
the enhanced criminal penalties. Potentially high fines and lengthy
prison sentences alone, as will be demonstrated, may neither deter
proceeding against the more serious and harder to prove underlying conduct); Geraldine Szott
Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons From Current White Collar Cases
and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165 (2004) (noting that with the increase of
prosecutorial power to engage in inquisitorial investigate and enter into non-adversarial plea
bargains limits effective deterrence for it fails to "enunciate a standard and produces inconsistent
sentences"); Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar
Criminal Law, 43 Hous. L. REV. 591 (2006) (uses the Martha Stewart case to raise issues cc a-
cerning, inter alia, the vagueness of criminal statutes, the merger of civil and criminal standards,
and the various sentencing policies.), Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713 (1999) (discussing instances of governmental malfea-
sance with limited judicial review).
228. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
229. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 409 (2003).
230. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 26 (West 3d ed.) (2000) (observing that under
this theory, also called revenge or retaliation, punishment is inflicted by society on criminals in
order to obtain revenge because it is only fitting and just that one who has caused harm to others
should himself suffer for it). See also Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct, 71
B.U. L. REV. 421, 430 (1991).
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these particular offenders, nor sufficiently punish them given the ex-
ponential payout such frauds provide.
A. Why Threats of Imprisonment May Not be Enough
While the threat of imprisonment may work to deter some potential
wrongdoers from unlawful acts, the prevailing crime and punishment
literature casts doubt on the effectiveness of reliance on increased
terms of imprisonment alone.2 31 At best, there is only lukewarm sup-
port for that position. Indeed, empirical research regarding deter-
rence of white collar offenders is generally inconclusive. 232
Society nevertheless continues to favor incarceration as the princi-
pal means to punish numerous categories of wrongdoers despite ade-
quate evidence of its impact. Supporters of an economic approach to
punishment, however, generally oppose incarcerating white-collar
criminals, arguing instead that analyzing the societal cost-benefit of
fining versus imprisonment would lead one to favor fining.233 These
231. The debates on the punishment of criminals generally and the relative merits of imposing
fines versus incarceration as effective criminal sanctions for white collar offenders (in particular),
including the impact of their respective severity, has been on-going for almost thirty years. See
generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 173, 185-93 (2004); Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning
White collar Criminals? 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485,492 and 495-96 (1999) (citing William J. Chambliss,
Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 703 (1967); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of
Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 422 (1980) (arguing the threat of incarceration
typically will have a greater deterrent value than the threat of fine; more deterrence is generated
by penalties focuses on an individual than on an organization; and the certainty of a sanction is
more important than the severity); Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White Collar
Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 409-414, 417-18 (1980) (arguing the application of the
economic analysis of crime, pioneered by Gary Becker, requires that white collar criminals be
punished only by monetary penalties (i.e., fines) rather than by imprisonment); Gary Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
232. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 414-15 (2003) (observing that the creation
of an empirical study to measure the effect of deterrence or to determine optimal sanctions is
near impossible because the target group - people who decide not to engage in criminal conduct
- ordinarily do not announce such decisions thus allowing for the gathering of empirical evi-
dence). See also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 173, 182-85, 189 (2004); Coffee, supra note
231, at 425.
233. The economic theory for optimal use of punishment was introduced by Gary Becker at
the University of Chicago, who argued for a cost minimization model which takes into account:
(1) the social costs that result from illegal conduct; (2) the punishment costs associated with the
imposition of sanctions on the wrongdoer; and (3) the transactional cost of judicial administra-
tion - i.e., the cost of apprehending and punishing the offenders. See Gary Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Becker argues that the use
of fines as punishment minimizes the social loss resulting from the crime. See also Posner, supra
note 231, at 410 and 417.
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"optimal use" theorists maintain that even if there is, in fact, an opti-
mal term of imprisonment that will engender the desired deterrent
effect - because of the brutality of the guards and other inmates, or
the accompanying stigmatic impact, or incarceration's interference
with an individual's sense of freedom - there still exists some mone-
tary equivalent that takes into account all of the factors that can make
imprisonment a source of disutility.234 Proponents further argue that
where society stands to benefit from two alternatives, society should
opt for the alternative that is the least costly.2 35 Stated simply, they
believe that fining white collar offenders is a better use of societal
resources than is incarceration. 236  The optimal fine, it is argued,
should be determined by analyzing the economic harm caused by the
wrongdoing, multiplied by a factor which reflects the likelihood of
capture, plus the cost of investigating and prosecuting the individ-
ual. 237 The greater one's income, the greater the cost of imprisonment
in terms of lost earnings to society.238 To be effective, of course, these
fines should exceed the profit made in the crime, and there must be a
high collection rate for them.239
It goes without saying that there is great resistance to the general
notion of fining wrongdoers as a substitute for imprisonment. 240
234. See Posner, supra note 231, at 414 (observing that "[i]f it is true, for whatever reason, that
imprisonment is unpleasant relative to fines ... this simply affects the exchange rate between
dollars of fine and days of imprisonment and not the choice of which method of punishment to
use. If we think that the term of imprisonment for a crime provides the correct amount of
deterrence, then in computing the fine equivalent we will want to be sure that we take account of
all of the factors that make imprisonment a source of disutility. The fine equivalent is still the
cheaper punishment methods, however, as long as the fine can be collected from the offender").
235. Id. (arguing that where an equal measure of deterrence can be derived from imposing
optimal fines as incarceration, imposing the optimal fine is a more efficient use of societies re-
sources, particularly where society's cost of incarcerating the criminal is great).
236. Id. at 410-12 (arguing that the cost of collecting a fine from one who can pay it is lower
than the cost to society of imprisoning the offender .... Hence "fining the affluent offender is
preferable to imprisoning him from society's standpoint because it is less costly and no less
efficacious").
237. Id. at 410-11; Steven Shavell, A Note on Marginal Deterrence, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
345, 345 (1992).
238. See Posner, supra note 231, at 410.
239. Posner, supra note 231, at 410 (noting that the "fine for a white collar crime can be set at
whatever level imposes the same disutility on the defendant, and thus yield the same deterrence,
as the prison sentence that would be imposed instead").
240. See e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 231, at 419; Jennifer S. Recine, Examination of the White
Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1566
(2002) (observing that "some effects inherent in the psychological aspects of incarceration sim-
ply cannot be achieved through levying fines'); Dan M. Kahan, & Eric A. Posner, Shamine
White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. &
ECON. 365, 371 (1999) (suggesting that white-collar criminals who were subject to fines (which
may require selling everything), still will be able to obtain and spend some money before the
state finds out - either by hiding income, or working illegally).
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Commentators note that the threat of imprisonment is inherently bet-
ter than fining because the so-called "optimal fine" may exceed the
offender's ability to pay; the threat of imprisonment still must exist in
order to motivate the offender to pay the fine; courts are not properly
equipped to determine the trade-offs and would waste considerable
time and resources in making such an attempt; reliance on fines would
have a discriminatory effect on the poor; and offenders are "risk
preferrers" with regard to imprisonment even if they are "risk
averters" with regard to fines.241
Of the many arguments against fining as a sufficient means of deter-
ring white collar criminals, including that the optimal fine may exceed
the offender's ability to pay,242 the argument that "the deterrent
threat of the law comes not from the specific sanction that the court
imposes ... but from the range of possible penalties it could impose"
has the most merit.243 The potential offender's attitude towards risk
will differ according to the types of sanctions that could be employed,
thereby implicating differing levels of marginal disutility. If an of-
fender, therefore, is forced to consider a range of penalties that in-
clude both probable imprisonment and something else,244 such as the
sanction of asset forfeiture (which not only reaches the unlawful pro-
ceeds of the criminal action, but also those assets flowing therefrom),
there might be a greater deterrent impact from the imposed punish-
ment. Moreover, the additional forfeiture penalty has an added bene-
fit because it also uniquely offers the possibility of victim
compensation. 245
Reliance on incarceration alone to deter corporate wrongdoers also
is risky because that reliance may be grounded on some faulty as-
sumptions about prison's impact on white collar offenders. Notwith-
standing some disparate impact on white collar offenders (who
typically are unaccustomed to the deprivation involved), scholars ac-
knowledge that the punitive value of imprisonment is "front
241. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 231, at 419. To determine whether a particular outcome will
be selected by a rational actor, one must first determine whether the actor is a "risk averter" or a
"risk preferrer." A risk preferrer will place greater value on the upside chance of additional gain
than the downside chance of additional loss; and vice versa for the risk averter. In general, most
economists would generally agree that individuals tend to be risk averters. Id. at 429-30.
242. Id. at 436-39 (arguing that the "collectability boundary" shields wealth and weakens the
deterrent impact).
243. Id. at 428.
244. The "something else" must be more than the recently-enacted higher fines, which may
not sufficiently punish corporate fraudsters. In many instances, the payout from their frauds
overshadows even the highest fines imposed.
245. See discussion infra.
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loaded. ' 246 That is, if one is to lose his freedom, he will prefer to lose
his freedom in the future, and if he must lose his freedom over a sig-
nificant period of time, the years closest to the present will be the
most burdensome. 247 The marginal utility of imprisonment therefore
diminishes with time spent in prison.248 A ten-year sentence is not ten
times more punitive than a one-year sentence. 249 The defendant sim-
ply adjusts to his or her circumstances after the initial shock wears
off.250 Moreover, white collar criminals are more likely to be treated
gently by prison officials since they tend to be "model prisoners," who
act in a more pleasant, and obedient manner than other prisoners.251
Similarly, although white collar prosecutions generate significant
media attention, allowing judges and prosecutors to utilize the media
scrutiny to relay a message of shame to the targeted audience so as to
discourage others from committing similar offenses,252 the stigma of
shame (if it exists at all), and any corresponding reputational loss, also
eventually wears off for the offender, or is forgotten by the public.
2 53
246. See e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 231, at 432; Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar
Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485,496 (1999); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Crimi-
nal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 173, 190
(2004).
247. Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable By
Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 481 (1975).
248. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 231, at 431 (noting that "[i]n the case of incarceration ... the
declining marginal utility of imprisonment means that each increment of incarceration increases
the perceived penalty by a less than proportionate amount."). See also A. Mitchell Polinsky and
Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence,
28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999) (explaining that the cost of imprisonment to the offender declines
over time.); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 173, 189-190 (2004) (observing that each
additional unit of prison time will have a near constant cost, but the punitive bite of each unit
will become increasingly less.).
249. See id.
250. Coffee, supra note 231, at 432 (observing that "the psychic injury that accompanies [the]
sudden powerlessness can be unacceptable [and even if] the initial socialization to prison is bru-
tal and demeaning.... human beings can adapt and endure.").
251. See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY 173 (2006).
252. See Elizabeth Szockyj, supra note 231, at 492. See also Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative
Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959 (1999).
253. Jack Grubman, for example, is still in demand - or at least his list of contacts. He was
once Wall Street's top telecom analyst but was banned from the securities industry for life. Nev-
ertheless, companies are still looking to hire him. According to one CEO, "I know his whole
background, but that's not enough to keep me from hiring him.... This is the kind of business
where connections and introductions are the difference between success and failure." Janet
Guyon, Jack Grubman is Back. Just Ask Him, FORTUNE , May 16, 2005. See also Randall Smith
and Susan Pulliam, Grubman Still Rates Himself "Buy," WALL ST. J., April 2, 2003. Similarly,
Michael Milken, the former Drexel junk bond king who plead guilty to six felonies in 1990,
served time in prison, and was barred for life from the securities industry, has re-emerged as a
deal-maker - all despite being sanctioned by the SEC again in 1998 for allegedly violating the
ban. Randall Smith and Susan Pulliam, Grubman Still Rates Himself "Buy," WALL ST. J., April
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Focusing entirely on one aspect of punishment therefore may be
misplaced. Effective deterrence inevitably comes from the overall
criminal process itself - i.e., the charge, trial, conviction, and sentenc-
ing, with the actual term of incarceration adding proportionately lit-
tle.25 4 Whatever incremental deterrence that may occur will be
produced before the imprisonment sanction is imposed. 255 Indeed,
most students of the criminal process locate the source of the stigma
in the fact of conviction rather than in the form of sentence. 256 Never-
theless, until detection, apprehension, and prosecution methods are
modified with respect to all corporate offenders, the punishment
prong - standing alone - must be of the sort to increase the deterrent
effect.
B. Why Asset Forfeiture Makes Particular Sense in Cases of Fraud
Deterrent-based punishment rests on the economic principle that
individuals will engage in utility-maximizing behavior.257 In other
words, the rational-choice model of human behavior suggests that in-
dividuals "can perfectly process available information about alterna-
tive courses of action ...can rank possible outcomes of expected
utility [and can] choose the course of action that will maximize [their]
personal expected utility. '258 When applied to criminal law, this
model requires potential offenders to weigh the risk of detection, ap-
prehension, and the severity of punishment against any benefits that
2, 2003. Today, Milken is a noted philanthropic who seeking to increase funding for cancer
research, using his foundation the Prostate Cancer Foundation, which has raised more than $210
million from 1993 -2003. Cora Daniels, The Man Who Changed Medicine, FORTUNE, Nov. 29,
2004.
254. See generally Szockyj, supra note 231, at 495.
255. See Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals? 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 495
(1999). See also Michael K. Block and Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punish-
able By Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 481 (1975) (observing that "[t]his is partly because
one adjusts to prison life...").
256. See Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 409, 416-17 (1980).
257. See generally Coffee, supra note 231, at 419 (arguing that economists "have begun to
analyze aspects of human behavior not characterized by market transactions. In so doing, econ-
omists have applied their central premise that individuals engage in utility-maximizing behavior
to such diverse fields as family planning, political participation, altruism, and crime." (citations
omitted)).
258. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture And Human Frailty To Rational Actors: A Critique
Of Classical Law And Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989). See also GARY S.
BECKER, THE EcoNoMic APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) (observing "all human
behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of
preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of
markets").
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might result from the purported illegal act.2 59 Under the circum-
stances, a rational actor will forgo criminality where the likelihood of
apprehension is high, or where the targeted population fears the pro-
spective punishment. 260 SarbOx's enhanced criminal penalties were
enacted based primarily on the deterrent theory of punishment. In
short, the drafters of SarbOx's criminal measures view potential white
collar offenders as rational actors, who will undertake the cost-benefit
assessments before acting and will decide to forgo the proposed un-
lawful act in fear of the potential punishment.
The expected penalty must outweigh any benefit to the offender if
he is to be deterred. If the benefit is great enough, some actors will be
willing to gamble on the outcome. Take for example the payout on
which Scott D. Sullivan (WorldCom's CFO) was willing to gamble.
During his recent sentencing hearing, U.S. District Court Judge Bar-
bara S. Jones reportedly stated, "In keeping [the WorldCom $11 bil-
lion accounting scheme] going, [Sullivan] was preserving his $700,000
salary [and] $10 million bonus and [$10 million in exercisable] stock
options. '261 While there is no evidence that Sullivan looked at the
downside of his involvement in the WorldCom fraud, there are some
other potential offenders who can and will reconcile the virtual cer-
tainty of spending some time in prison (which typically is less in com-
parison to other criminals and, in any event, rarely the maximum
allowable) when caught, against the exponential profit potential from
the criminal violation if they have some assurances that their lifestyle
upon release will be desirous. To them, the potential incarceration
would not diminish the overall benefits obtained through fraud. The
prospect of giving up one's freedom without a tangible benefit in the
end may change the gambler's odds, however.
All commentators agree that the certainty of a sanction is a more
important deterrent than is its severity.2 62 A determinate sentencing
259. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 956-59 (2003). See generally RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 206 (3d ed. 1986).
260. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 359, 414 (2003); Daniel J. Freed, Federal
Sentencing in the wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentences, 101
YALE L. J. 1681, 1707 (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 249 (5th ed.
1998).
261. See Jennifer Bayot and Roben Farzad, WorldCom Executive Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
12, 2005; Carrie Johnson, Ex-WorldCom CFO Gets 5-Year Term, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2005.
262. See generally Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 Crime and Justice
1, 30 (2006); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004). See supra Part III.C. for a discus-
sion of uncertainty surrounding the imposition of maximum terms of imprisonment.
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structure for incarcerative sentences generates more deterrence than
an indeterminate one because the former essentially eliminates the
gamble the offender wishes to take.263 Given the variables regarding
the imposition of higher fines and lengthier sentences, 264 adding a
mandatory asset forfeiture sanction to the government's arsenal of
criminal sanctions would provide the needed certainty, and increase
the corresponding deterrent effect.
Having said that, some behavioral economists and psychologists
note the limitations of the rational-choice based theory of deterrence.
Not all potential offenders are rational actors. Moreover, some po-
tential offenders may engage in imperfect cost-benefit analyses. Indi-
viduals differ in their tendencies to be optimistic and confident in their
ability to control future events.265 Corporate executives who are
overly confident may fail to appreciate the risks that may accompany
their actions. Their judgment biases may depend somewhat on their
self-esteem, in the sense that those with the highest levels are the most
likely to misjudge their control over future events, and even their skill
sets. 266 As a result, they may assign any resulting success to their in-
herent skills, while equally assigning failure to just bad luck.267 They
may, in other words, persuade themselves that any setback at the com-
pany is temporary, so their cover-ups need only work for a while to be
successful. 268
While potentially lengthy terms of imprisonment alone may not
work to deter these particular types of criminal actors, the mandatory
asset forfeiture sanction does change the equation if the actor either
fails to undertake the cost-benefit analysis altogether, or fails to cor-
rectly weigh the equation's multiple prongs. Asset forfeiture becomes
a potent weapon, under all of these circumstances. Any purported
benefit from the wrongdoing is erased if the offender is caught. The
punishment prong is strengthened by this lose-lose proposition. Now,
263. See Coffee, supra note 231, at 431.
264. See discussion supra Part I1I.C.
265. See Larry E. Ribstein, Markets vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 20 (2002) (noting that "there is a large
literature on judgment biases that lead at least some people to tend to be more optimistic about
the future and more confident in their judgment and ability to control future events, than would
an actor who objectively processed the relevant data."). See also Szott Moohr, supra note 227,
at 958 (2003) ("Biased judgments, over-confidence, and an inflated sense of self-esteem interfere
with the capacity to perceive risk."); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of
Hyper-Competitions: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 968, 969-71 (2002). See also Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, supra note 231.
266. Ribstein, Markets supra note 265, at 20.
267. See Szott Moohr, supra note 227, at 958; Ribstein, supra note 265, at 20.
268. Ribstein, supra note 265, at 21.
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the prospect of giving up one's personal freedom without the ability to
return to the lifestyle once led - nor the ability to leave the family in
the lifestyle to which they have grown accustomed while the offender
is imprisoned - will change the "cost-benefit" equation by heightening
the punishment prong.
Increasing the chances of getting caught is obviously better than
merely increasing the certainty and severity of punishment. However,
since white collar crimes are by definition difficult to detect, and re-
main more costly and time-consuming both to investigate and prose-
cute than other crimes, the detection and apprehension prongs of the
deterrent equation continually have been devalued by corporate
fraudsters. Better detection arguably should now occur in light of the
Act's recent transparency provisions, and the SEC's increased budget
and staffing.269 But, until the Commission integrates its increased
staff and fully engages them into its oversight mission, the focus must
continue to be on the punishment prong of the cost-benefit equation.
Inserting asset forfeiture into the equation, making it predictable and
certain, undoubtedly should significantly strengthen the punishment
prong of an individual's cost-benefit calculation and heighten the
Act's deterrent effect.
Forfeiture also serves another function: it meets society's retribu-
tive goal - which appears to be another aim of SarbOx's criminal mea-
sures.270 The retributive notion of punishment reflects the belief that
punishment, in whatever form, should be imposed because those who
commit crimes choose evil over good and that those offenders, as re-
sponsible moral agents, deserve punishment.271 Retribution propo-
nents are less concerned with the punishment's deterrent effect. In
their view, the purpose of punishment is to demonstrate moral
blameworthiness. 272
This so-called "just deserts" rationale connotes that the punishment
should reflect the seriousness of the offense, not the characteristics of
the offender.273 Critics of the retributive theory, of course, object to
its ethical or moral basis for punishment because that theory ignores
"physiological, psychological, environmental, cultural, educational, ec-
269. Between fiscal year 2002 and 2004, the SEC hired more than 1,000 new employees. SEC,
2005 Performance and Accountability Report 2 (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/
secpar2005.shtml. The SEC also met its Sarbanes-Oxley requirement to review at least once
every three years the financial statements of each reporting company and investment company
issuer; reviewing over 6,000 reporting companies in fiscal year 2005. Id. at 11.
270. See Transcript of Conference Report on H.R. 3763, supra note 87.
271. Ramirez, supra note 260, at 409.
272. Saltzburg, supra note 230, at 430.
273. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 26 (3d ed. 2000).
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onomic, and hereditary factors" that may affect one's conduct.274
These objections should disappear when dealing with corporate of-
fenders. These white-collar offenders are particularly well-suited for
retributive sanctions because they have breached their agreement
with society; they were let into society's personal or financial affairs
based upon the fiduciaries' projected faqade of respectability and
trustworthiness only to betray that trust.2 75 Asset forfeiture would
reach the "spoils" of their illegal acts, and strike at the heart of the
criminals' economic motive for misusing their corporate status.
It is for all of these reasons that I propose that Congress enact spe-
cific forfeiture legislation that is directed towards violations of the se-
curities fraud statute.276 Such a provision would require the forfeiture
of all assets traceable to the corporate actor's fraud. Specifically, I
propose amending or expanding the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) to
include a provision that reads:
The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense
in violation of section 1348 of this title, shall order that the person
forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, which
constitutes or is traceable to the proceeds obtained, directly or indi-
rectly, as a result of such violation.277
Although not required by law, once the forfeited assets have been ob-
tained by the government, those funds should be placed in a victim-
related fund, rather than simply transferred to the U.S. Treasury. 278
To that end, Congress may be required to enact further legislation to
facilitate the distribution of such forfeited funds into either the newly-
created Federal Account for Investor Restitution ("FAIR") fund
(which is intended to assist victims of financial fraud who seek to ob-
tain restitution), or something akin to it.279
274. See Ramirez, supra note 260, at 409 (citing David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Crimi-
nal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 396 (1976)).
275. See Ramirez, supra note 260, at 409.
276. See discussion of the problems associated with reliance on existing forfeiture legislation,
infra Part VII.
277. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) and (3) (2002). Congress also should similarly expand the
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 981(a) to authorize civil asset forfeiture for violations of the securities fraud
statute. The existing forfeiture statute for violations of the federal securities law limits such
actions to "fraud in the sale of securities." 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2002); § 1956(c)(7)(A);
§ 1961(1)(D).
278. The distribution of criminally forfeited property is governed by federal statute. See 18
U.S.C. 982(b)(1) (2002); §1963(g); 21 U.S.C §881(e) (2002). The federal government has two
funds for forfeited proceeds: (1) Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund authorized under
28 U.S.C. §524(c); and (2) Department of Treasury Forfeiture Fund authorized at 31 U.S.C.
§9703(a). See also www.usdoj.gov/jmd/afp/0lprogramaudit/auditreport72002.htm.
279. If in any judicial or administrative action brought by the SEC under the securities laws
the SEC obtains an order requiring disgorgement against any person, or such person agrees in
settlement to such disgorgement, and the SEC also obtains a civil penalty against such person,
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C. Why Restitution Alone is an Inadequate Solution
Clearly, it may be difficult to fully compensate all victims of corpo-
rate and securities fraud, particularly in the case of issuer financial
fraud violations which may cause such huge investor losses that dwarf
any funds or profits obtained by the corporate wrongdoers. 280 How-
ever, the forfeiture sanction increases the potential recovery from
those wrongdoers more than a simple restitution order because the
forfeiture order reaches (and potentially freezes) more of the offend-
ers' assets. In that manner, asset forfeiture is not the same as, and is
more favorable than, restitution.
Restitution is designed to compensate the victims of wrongful acts.
It is an equitable remedy by which a person is restored to his or her
original position prior to the loss or injury.281 Most jurisdictions pro-
vide for restitution to the victims of a crime.282 Courts sometimes
confuse actions for restitution with disgorgement orders since both
pursue a parallel goal of separating the defendant from the benefit of
any "ill gotten gains. '2 3 Disgorgement, nevertheless, is not restitu-
tion since disgorgement does not seek to compensate the victims of
wrongdoing, but is an equitable remedy meant to prevent the wrong-
doer from unjustly enriching himself by that wrong doing.284 As a
result, the defendant may be ordered to relinquish an amount that is
more or less than is required to make the victims whole. Courts sim-
ply need to find a causal relationship to the wrongdoing and the funds
the amount of such civil penalty shall, on motion or at the direction of the SEC, be added to and
become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit of the victims of such violation. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act § 308. The SEC is also authorized to accept, hold, administer and utilize gifts, be-
quests and devises of property to the United States for any such disgorgement fund. Id.
280. Case in point, WorldCom's former chief executive officer Bernard Ebbers was found
guilty of directing the $11 billion accounting fraud that led to the company's bankruptcy filing
although evidence shows that he profited at a significantly lower amount.
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 375 (1981).
282. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663. The beneficiary of a restitution order simply registers the restitu-
tion order in the same manner as a civil judgment. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m). However, unlike civil
judgments, a criminal restitution order issued under federal law is not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(13), 1328(a)(3) (2002).
283. See SEC Report, Report Pursuant to Section 308(c) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002,
at 3 n.2 (reporting that "[riestitution is intended to make investors whole, and disgorgement is
meant to deprive the wrongdoer of their ill-gotten gain."), available at www.sec.gov/news/stud-
ies/sox308creport.pdf.
284. See SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 5:321
CULTURE OF UNDER-ENFORCEMENT
or property sought to be disgorged. 285 To that end, disgorgement is
similar to the asset forfeiture sanction.286
Forfeiture laws, as illustrated in Part V above, allow for the recov-
ery of more than just the unlawfully obtained proceeds of the wrong-
ful act, but also authorize the recovery of any additional assets
traceable to those criminal proceeds. Moreover, forfeiture orders al-
low governmental investigators and prosecutors to trace and restrain
criminally derived property early in the criminal proceedings (and
even sooner if the government relies upon the civil asset forfeiture
sanction), which can prevent criminal proceeds from being dissipated,
transferred, and even hidden offshore.
In this regard, asset forfeiture is more advantageous than mere reli-
ance on criminal restitution. Suppose, for example, that a corporate
wrongdoer unlawfully obtains $5 million through a fraudulent ac-
counting or reporting scheme that harms his company. If that of-
fender subsequently used those illicit funds to place a bet on Giacomo
(the 2005 Kentucky Derby winner) to receive a $20 million payout, he
would still be ahead of the game when the fraud was uncovered, as he
could expect to disgorge no more than $5-10 million in restitution and
penalties. He, like some other potential offenders, arguably can rec-
oncile the virtual certainty of spending some time in prison if caught
against the exponential profit potential from the criminal violation
particularly where he has some assurances that he can return to his
previous lifestyle upon release. Stated differently, his potential im-
prisonment and certain restitution payment may not lead to the neces-
sary deterrence where the corporate fraudster is still able to finance
his family's pre-sentencing lifestyle, including their use of the mansion
and vacation homes, private school for the children, and country club
memberships (if not shamed away). Without a forfeiture penalty, the
resourceful convicted white collar criminal can seemingly return to his
comfortable status upon release. 287
285. See SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (requiring a show-
ing that the amount sought is "a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the
violation.").
286. Of course, disgorgement may not be used punitively. See First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d
at 1231.
287. Even though he was not criminally prosecuted, Jack Grubman is hardly contrite after
being barred from the securities industry and having to pay a substantial $15 million fine. He
reportedly stated that he was going to leave the industry anyway and given that his net worth is
somewhere between $50 million and $70 million, he will probably continue his earlier lifestyle.
See Guyon , supra note 253.
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VII. How ASSET FORFEITURE WOULD WORK IN FINANCIAL
FRAUD CASES
Until Congress enacts penalties that also include a forfeiture sanc-
tion for violations of the securities fraud statute, federal prosecutors
can and should routinely seek to obtain asset forfeiture from financial
fraud offenders using the existing forfeiture statutes. The primary for-
feiture statutes for non-drug related crimes are found at sections 981
and 982 of title 18 of the United States Code. Unfortunately, given
that these provisions are overly complicated to navigate, many prose-
cutors are led to ignore their utility in most cases. Nevertheless, the
easiest way to seize property would be to charge and prove a money
laundering violation, while seeking forfeiture under either 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) (the civil forfeiture provision), or 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(1) (the criminal forfeiture provision). 288 It is black letter law
that a district court in sentencing a person convicted of money laun-
dering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 or 1957 "shall order that the
person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, in-
volved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property. ''2 89
Some may argue that this approach favors overcharging, and forces
prosecutors to bring the more serious crime of money laundering
rather than the underlying crimes, which typically has been mail fraud
or wire fraud.290 However, the SarbOx criminal measures equalize
the fines and terms of imprisonment. Moreover, in many instances,
288. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A), 982(a)(1) (2002).
289. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2002). Similarly, § 981(a)(1) provides in relevant part: The fol-
lowing property is subject to forfeiture to the United States: (A) Any property, real or personal,
involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of section 1956, 1957 or 1960 of
this title, or any property traceable to such property. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A).
290. The mail and wire fraud statutes have long been favored by prosecutors given their rela-
tively straight-forward standards of proof. In fact, prosecutors refer to the statutes as "our
Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart." Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail
Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980). The statutes proscribe the use of the
mails or wires (including faxes, telephones, e-mail) to further fraudulent activity. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341 and 1343 (2002). The government need only prove the existence of: (i) a scheme to
defraud - i.e., the manipulation of corporate records for personal gain; (ii) committed with the
intent to defraud; (iii) while using the United States mails or private interstate commercial carri-
ers in furtherance of the scheme or, in the case of wire fraud, the communication must be trans-
mitted through the wires across state lines. The "scheme to defraud" element has been read
broadly. See e.g., Unites States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065, 1066 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that
language of federal mail fraud statute must be interpreted broadly and liberally to further pur-
pose of statute). The government must simply show that the defendant intended to harm the
victim (the corporation and its shareholders) by depriving the victim of money, property, or
honest services. Prosecutors need not even prove that the scheme to defraud necessarily came
to fruition, nor that the scheme caused any loss. See e.g. United States v. Falkowitz, 214 F.
Supp.2d 365, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citations omitted). The requisite bad intent also can be in-
ferred from circumstantial evidence of the same.
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the facts needed to support a mail or wire fraud conviction will also be
the facts sufficient to obtain a money laundering conviction. Once the
fraud has been perpetrated, as will be discussed below, the offenders
often will seek to conceal the nature and source of such proceeds.
Further, there is only a limited ability now to obtain the forfeiture of
assets for any violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, particularly
if there are no so-called "special circumstances." In other words, the
mail and wire fraud violation must affect a financial institution in or-
der to support an action for criminal forfeiture. 291
While no such requirement exists for civil forfeiture actions that are
brought for violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes, there are
disadvantages. First, that statute is difficult to navigate as it does not
specifically provide for the forfeiture of property "which constitutes or
is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation" of the mail and wire
fraud statute.292 Prosecutors are directed from section 981(a)(1)(C) to
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) where they must search through the list of
"specified unlawful activities," only to be sent to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),
where mail fraud and wire fraud are finally included within the list of
"racketeering activity. ' 293 That stated, upon proof of the mail fraud
or wire fraud violation, the government can take action against any
property that constitutes the proceeds of, or is derived from, the crimi-
nal violation - regardless of whether the property owner has ever
been charged with a crime.
This potential outcome leads to the other disadvantage of relying
solely on section 981 to obtain the forfeiture of the targeted property.
Given that there is no requirement of a prior conviction of the prop-
erty owners, these forfeitures necessarily will lead to increased proce-
dural and substantive criticisms, as well as claims of lack of
accountability and corruption on the part of the government.294 The
government's ability also to bring criminal forfeiture actions, on the
other hand, purportedly will silence many of these concerns.
Still, neither mail fraud, nor wire fraud violations (as previously
stated) can support a criminal forfeiture action unless the fraud effects
291. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(3) (2002). See e.g., United States v. Grass, 274 F. Supp. 2d 648,
653 (M.D. Pa 2003); United States v. Day, 416 F. Supp. 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2006).
292. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2002).
293. Subsection (a)(1)(C) includes "any offense constituting 'specified unlawful activity' (as
defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this title) ...." Section 1957(c)(7) then sets forth a list of crimes
that constitute a "specified unlawful activity," and incorporates by reference the list of offenses
that 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) defines as acts which constitute "racketeering activity" under the RICO
statute, and includes several state crimes such as murder, extortion, bribery and gambling as well
as mail fraud, wire fraud; a list of other enumerated federal crimes; and certain violations of
foreign law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C), 1956(c)(7), 1961(1) (2002).
294. See infra note 227.
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a financial institution. Critics may continue to argue that it remains
unnecessary to charge a money laundering violation simply to obtain
the criminal forfeiture sanction in light of the fact that CAFRA also
authorizes criminal forfeiture actions (in accordance with 21 U.S.C.
§ 853) for any offense which Congress has authorized civil forfeiture
but for which no corresponding criminal forfeiture statute exists, and
where the defendant is charged and convicted of the underlying
crime.295 However, several jurisdictions are split of its application,
with several district courts holding that section 2461(c) does not ex-
pand the scope of preexisting criminal forfeiture provisions whenever
a related civil forfeiture provision is broader.296 Adding fuel to an
already simmering fire, Congress recently amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 2461(c), and seemingly narrowed the scope of forfeitures authorized
by the provision,297 which in turn may lead to further uncertainty
about its applicability. This uncertainty will once again cause prosecu-
tors to defer to civil asset forfeiture actions (and their attendant
criticisms).
The money laundering violation, which will support both a civil and
criminal forfeiture sanction, thus remains a viable option. The prose-
cutor, as a starting point under either forfeiture provision, must prove
295. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (Apr. 25, 2000, Pub. L. 106-185, § 16). Specifically, Section 2461
(c), formerly provided: If a forfeiture of property is authorized in connection with a violation of
an Act of Congress, and any person is charged in an indictment or information with such viola-
tion but no specific statutory provision is made for criminal forfeiture upon conviction, the Gov-
ernment may include the forfeiture in the indictment or information in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and upon conviction, the court shall order the forfeiture of
the property in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 413 of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection (d) of that section. Id.
296. See United States v. Day, 416 F. Supp. 2d 79, 86 (D.D.C. 2006); United States v. Croce,
345 F.Supp.2d 492, 496 (E.D.Pa.2004); United States v. Grass, No. 02-146, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26045, at *15-16 (M.D.Pa.2002); United States v. Thompson, No 02-CR-116, 2002 WL
31667859, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.2002); but see United States v. Schlesinger, 396 F. Supp. 2d 267, 275
(E.D.N.Y.2005) ("[U]nder the plain terms of [28 U.S.C. § 2461(c)] criminal forfeiture for mail
and wire fraud is permitted."); United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2006)
(where the court held, "In sum, we reject Croce II and read the plain language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2461(c) as permitting criminal forfeiture of proceeds from general mail fraud because a statu-
tory provision-18 U.S.C. § 981 (a)(2)(C)-permits civil forfeiture of such proceeds and no crim-
inal forfeiture provision applies to general mail fraud.").
297. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (Mar. 9, 2006, Pub. L. 109-177, Title IV, § 410). Revised section
2461(c) provides: If a person is charged in a criminal case with a violation of an Act of Congress
for which the civil or criminal forfeiture of property is authorized, the Government may include
notice of the forfeiture in the indictment or information pursuant to the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. If the defendant is convicted of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture, the court
shall order the forfeiture of the property as part of the sentence in the criminal case pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 3554 of title 18, United States Code. The
procedures in section 413 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853) apply to all stages of
a criminal forfeiture proceeding, except that subsection (d) of such section applies only in cases
in which the defendant is convicted of a violation of such Act. Id.
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a violation of either 18 U.S.C. § 1956 or 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Section
1956, entitled "Laundering of Monetary Instruments," targets finan-
cial transactions298 that involve the proceeds of criminal activities and
financial transactions that are intended to cover up the source of the
funds,299 while section 1957, entitled "Engaging in Monetary Transac-
tions in Property Derived From Specified Unlawful Activity," targets
those monetary transactions in criminally derived funds in amounts
over $10,000.300 Although Section 1956 actually contains three dis-
tinct money laundering violations,30' this article will target the subsec-
tion on which prosecutors chiefly rely when charging white collar
defendants: subsection (a)(1), which is violated when one takes part
in a financial transaction with criminally-derived "proceeds of speci-
fied unlawful activity. '302 As illustrated above, both mail fraud and
298. The transaction must either (i) affect interstate or foreign commerce and involves the
movement of funds by wire or other means, or the movement of one or more monetary instru-
ments, or the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel or aircraft; or (ii) involve a
financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, in any way or degree. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (2002). "Monetary Instrument" is de-
fined in § 1956(c)(5) as currency, money orders, checks, travelers checks, or investment securi-
ties or negotiable instruments in bearer form (or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes
upon delivery).
299. Section 1956 specifically targets efforts (i) to conduct or attempt to conduct a financial
transaction involving unlawful proceeds, or (ii) to transfer, transmit, or transport unlawful pro-
ceeds or monetary instruments from within the United States to a place outside with the intent
to promote the fraud; to conceal or disguise the nature of the unlawful proceeds; or to avoid the
transaction reporting requirements under state or federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2002).
300. It is a felony to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of
a value greater than $10,000 where the property is derived from the broad array of "specified
unlawful activities" that are set forth in section 1956(c)(7). 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2002). The most
significant difference between a section 1956 violation and a section 1957 violation is that the
latter has no specific intent requirement, thus making it easier for the government to prevail. It
is simply a crime to do virtually anything with the proceeds of a criminal activity if such proceeds
exceed $10,000.
301. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3). Subsection (a)(2) is similar to subsection
(a)(1), except the former criminalizes the knowing international movement of funds or monetary
instruments. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1)-(2). It is also distinct in one key respects: it is unneces-
sary to prove the existence of a financial transaction as required by subsection (a)(1); the gov-
ernment need only show that a transfer of proceeds occurred either into, or out of, the United.
It is worth noting that subsection (a)(3) rarely will be charged in connection with corporate
mismanagement violations as that section applies only where there has been a government
"sting" operation. In other words, this offense differs from a section 1956(a)(1) offence in that
the property involved must have been represented by a law enforcement officer (or by a person
at the direction of a federal law enforcement officer) to be specified unlawful activity proceeds,
but in actuality is not.
302. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) provides in pertinent part that "Whoever, knowing that the prop-
erty involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,
conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds
of specified unlawful activity ... shall be sentenced to a fine ... or imprisonment for not more
than twenty years, or both." The violative transaction can be a deposit, withdrawal, transfer
between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, use of a safe deposit box, or
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wire fraud (among others) can serve as predicate violations for the
money laundering violation under section 1956(a)(1). 303
Once the predicate violations (e.g., mail fraud or wire fraud) have
been established, the prosecutor must prove the other elements of the
money laundering violation. The government has the burden of es-
tablishing that the defendant knew that the money involved in the
financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful
activity (e.g., the mail fraud or wire fraud) that constitutes a felony
under state, federal, or foreign law.3°4 Actual proof that the defendant
knew from what form of unlawful activity the property was derived,
however, is unnecessary. The defendant's knowledge of the source of
unlawful proceeds can be established either by evidence of his in-
volvement in the specified unlawful activity, or by other direct evi-
dence. It also can be established circumstantially where the defendant
is not the perpetrator of the underlying offense, or where it can be
established that the defendant was willfully blind to, or consciously
avoided learning, the unlawful source of property involved in a finan-
cial transaction. 30 5
The prosecutors must also prove that the defendant acted with a
specific intent to promote the fraud; to conceal or disguise the nature,
location, the source, the ownership, or control of the criminal pro-
ceeds; to engage in a criminal tax violation; or to evade a transaction
reporting obligation under federal or state law.30 6 In this regard,
merely proving that the defendant spent illegally-derived funds is not
enough to establish a money laundering violation under any section.
In the absence of a scheme to conceal the source of the money, no
court will sustain a conviction.30 7 However, making purchases in
someone else's name,30 8 placing funds in third-party accounts30 9 or
trusts, or the creation of sham documentation to mask the source of
funds is evidence of concealment. 310
In the case of corporate financial fraud, many of the defendants in
the recent scandals who either designed or facilitated the fraudulent
any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(c)(3) (2002).
303. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7)(A), 1961(1)(B) (2002).
304. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1) (2002).
305. See e.g., United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 1996).
306. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2002).
307. See e.g., United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991) (where court reversed a
conviction because the government failed to prove sufficient evidence of a "design to conceal"
where the defendant purchased a car, in person, in his own name, and openly used the car).
308. Id.
309. See e.g., Unites States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991).
310. See e.g., United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992).
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schemes, subsequently tried to cover up their misdeeds and conceal
the proceeds acquired therefrom, causing many to be charged with a
money laundering violation. 311 Accordingly, despite the extra effort
needed to rely on existing forfeiture statutes, prosecutors can use
these tools to combat corporate frauds until Congress enacts the for-
feiture sanction for violations of the securities fraud statute.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The privileged position of corporate fraudsters under the law exists
in contrast to their weakened and unprotected victims, and typically
stands in stark contrast to violators of other criminal statutes.
SarbOx's enhanced criminal penalties, while slightly more punitive,
are nevertheless inadequate to effectively battle and deter the corpo-
rate fraud problem. Meaningful asset forfeiture sanctions are needed
to shore up the Act's deterrent impact. In its effort to combat rising
lawlessness in decades past, Congress focused on the economic mo-
tives of wrongdoers and authorized the seizure of those illicit proceeds
traceable to their criminal acts to better combat drugs, organized
crime, bank fraud, and insider trading (to name a few). Why then
should the government limit itself to using such a powerful weapon
only against these particular offenders?
The ability to return to the lifestyle once led (purchased with funds
fraudulently obtained from their former corporation) should be elimi-
nated. While corporate offenders may be willing to reconcile the
prospect of spending some time behind bars for the sake of an expo-
nential payout, the prospect of giving up one's personal freedom with-
out some tangible benefit in the end will change the deterrent
equation. It is on this basis that I propose that Congress enact specific
forfeiture legislation that reaches the property involved in, or tracea-
ble to, violations of the newly-enacted securities fraud statute. Con-
gress recognized the economic motive of wrongdoers when it
authorized the forfeiture of executive bonuses pursuant to SarbOx
section 304. Regrettably, Congress stopped short of enacting mean-
ingful forfeiture legislation. In light of recent forfeiture consents and
the successful criminal prosecutions of many of the high-profiled cor-
porate defendants, the time seems right for Congress to take a new
look at the Act's criminal measures.
311. See Fastow Indictment, supra note 17; Ebbers and Sullivan Indictments, supra note 20.
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